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The Impact of Variances:
A Study of Statewide Zoning
David P. Bryden*
When a zoning board dispenses variances, one may evaluate
its performance from any of three perspectives: Has it followed
the legal criteria for granting relief? Have its proceedings been
orderly and fair? Have variances been so frequent as to undermine the policies behind the rules being varied? Legal scholars
have stressed the former two questions, treating the third more
as an afterthought than as a subject worthy of independent
analysis. This is not surprising. Issues of procedural regularity
and fidelity to law are certainly important, and they can be
discussed by reference to familiar, transcendent values of the
legal order. The effects of variances on substantive land use
policies, on the other hand, are exceedingly difficult to assess,
especially in the context of ordinary municipal zoning, where
every ordinance contains a unique hodgepodge of provisions that
are often provincial, picayune, or inscrutable.
Zoning, however, is very gradually becoming more uniform
and august. Most states have adopted, or are considering, some
limited forms of state-imposed regulations-controlling shoreland development, power plant siting, alterations of coastal wetlands, protection of "critical areas," and so forth.' This "quiet
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I am indebted to
several people for assistance in preparing this article. I received helpful
suggestions and encouragement from my colleagues Carl Auerbach, John
Cound, and Alan Freeman. Professor Joseph Shapiro, of the University
of Minnesota's Limnological Research Center, helped me to walk the
fine line between excessive complexity and oversimplification in explaining lake pollution. Some of the research for Part II was done by
two students: Mark Johnson ('72) and Steven Wellvang ('72). The
data for the tables in Part III were compiled by Nelson Berg ('76), David
Gilbertson ('77), Patrick Meade ('77), and Marlene Senechal ('77).
Their research was made possible by generous grants from the Graduate
School and Mrs. Elsie L. Fesler, who funded the John K. Fesler Memorial Fellowship in memory of her late husband. Mark Shepard ('78)

assisted with footnotes.

1. See generally CouNcn. ox ENVMON 5NTrAL QUA=ITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (annual reports 1970-75); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MiNx. L. REV. 869

(1972) [hereinafter cited as State Land Use Regulation]. There have
been several unsuccessful efforts to enact national land use legislation.
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revolution,"2 though still embryonic, has already created problems about which traditional zoning literature is uninformative.
One of the foremost questions is whether state policies are
being nullified by variances. In many of the new zoning systems,
the rules are drafted by state planners but administered by local
officials.3 As a result, the efficacy of state-imposed zoning is
suspect, partly because of uncertainty about the consequences of
local dispensations. How can one determine whether variances
are jeopardizing a zoning rule? When this occurs, should we
change the rule, the variance criteria, or the division of power
between the state and local governments? To reduce the substantive effects of variances, should we adopt reforms different
from those that are calculated to alleviate the ethical and legal
flaws of variance administration?
Such questions cannot be answered adequately until we
have developed methods for monitoring and appraising the substantive impacts of variances. To that end, we will begin by
summarizing the literature about variances, noting some of the
gaps that are pertinent to our topic. Then, as a case study, we
will examine Minnesota's statewide system of shoreland zoning
in order to understand the origins and rationales of its rules.
Finally, we will appraise data about the extent to which these
rules have been undermined by local variances.
I. VARIANCE SCHOLARSHIP
A. THE CONSENSUS
Few legal institutions have been more consistently and
vigorously criticized than zoning boards of adjustment, 4 whose
For a summary of such proposals in the 91st, 92nd, and 93rd Congresses,

see generally Healy, National Land Use Proposal: Land Use Legislation
of Landmark Environmental Significance, 3 ENVT'L AFr. 355 (1974).
2. F. BossELmAN & D. CALLIES, THE QuIET REvoLuTxoN IN LAND
USE CONTROL (1971).
3. See State Land Use Regulation, supra note 1, at 895. Under
other schemes, the state regulates land use directly, for example, by requiring a state permit to fill a coastal marsh. Id. at 890-94. But as a
political rule-of-thumb, a state's ability to promulgate standards for
local zoning exceeds its ability to displace local officials with a corps
of state administrators. For this reason, the administration of zoningeven of most state-imposed zoning-will surely remain primarily in local
hands, subject perhaps to new forms of state supervision.
4. See Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals-Villain or Victim?, 13 SYRAcusE L. REv. 353 (1962); Babcock, The Chaos of Zoning
Administration: One Solution, 12 ZONING DIG. 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Babcock, Chaos]; Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administra-
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major function is to consider applications for variances. 5

Com-

mentators, while not denying that variances are a necessary
"flexibility device," assert that the boards grant relief too freely,
flouting the law by following their own permissive inclinations
rather than the stricter standards laid down by the courts.6
The principal statutory criterion for variances is "unnecessary hardship." 7 In construing this opaque phrase, most courts
distinguish-at least implicitly-between "use" and "area" (or
"bulk") variances. 8 A use variance, as the term implies, authorizes a use of land that is normally impermissible in the district
where the land is situated-for example, a factory in a residential district.9 These dispensations are regarded as especially
tion in Illinois, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 509 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Babcock, The Unhappy State]; Blucher, Is Zoning Wagging the Dog?, in
AMERIcAN

SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING

1955, at 966;

R. Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible or Fluid?, 44 J.URnB. L. 287 (1966);
Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier]; Leary, The Zoning Administrator, in AMERICAN SocIETY OF
PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1958, at 224; Reps, DiscretionaryPowers of
the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 280 (1955);
Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969); Wexler, "A Zoning Ordinance
Is No Better Than Its Administration"--A Platitude Proved, 1 J. MAR.
J. PRAc. & Puoc. 74 (1967); Note, Zoning: Variance Administration
in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 101 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Alameda County]; Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARv.
L. REV.668 (1969); Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1396 (1961);
Note, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites on Decisions of Boards of
Zoning Appeals, 1 IND. LEGAL F. 398 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Statutory
Prerequisites];Note, Variance Administration in Indiana-Problemsand
Remedies, 48 IND. L.J. 240 (1973)

[hereinafter cited as Variance Admin-

istrationin Indiana]; Note, Syracuse Board of Zoning Appeals-An Appraisal, 16 SYRAcusE L. REV. 632 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as Syracuse

Board]; Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The PhiladelphiaExperience, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516 (1955) [hereinafter cited as The Philadephia Experience]; Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations, and
Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. Ray. 470 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Neighborhod Decline in Illinois].
Boards of adjustment are sometimes called boards of zoning appeals.
The term "board of adjustment" is from the Standard State Zoning En-

abling Act and will be used throughout this Article. See U.S. DEP'T.
OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (rev. ed.
1926).
5. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 13.09
(1968). Boards of adjustment often have other responsibilities as well,
such as granting special permits. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra, § 15.01.
6. See generally the sources cited in note 4 supra.
7. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 14.09, at 610-11.
8. Id. § 14.06.
9. Id. § 14.06, at 603.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 769

dangerous because they jeopardize zoning's primary purpose:
separating incompatible land uses.' 0 In some states, use variances are illegal; in others, they may be granted only if the
land in question could not otherwise yield a "reasonable return.""l
Area variances permit landowners to depart from dimensional rules-building height restrictions, setbacks, and the
like. 1 2 They are more common, but less controversial, than use
13
variances.'
Although often purporting to apply the same criteria to
both kinds of variances, most courts hold, in effect, that "practical difficulties" suffice to justify an area variance.' 4 This test
does not require a showing that without a variance the land
cannot yield a reasonable return.' 5 Nevertheless, the practical
difficulties test is more stringent than it may sound. Although
the requisite difficulties need not amount to an unconstitutional
"taking," they must consist of more than proof that a variance
would be useful to the applicant, for instance by increasing his
profits. 16 The difficulties must be attributable to peculiarities of
the land itself, not to some independent personal problem such
as bad health or business opportunities. 17 The applicant's problem must also be "unique," which seems to mean that it must
not be so widely shared by surrounding landowners that the
appropriate remedy is to amend the ordinance.' 8 As with use
variances, the boards should not grant an area variance merely
because the neighbors do not object or because those who
support the applicant outnumber the protesters. 19 Similarly,
no area: variance should be granted on the ground that the rule is
unwise or that the deviation seems harmless, just as no use
variance should be granted on the ground that the neighborhood
needs to be rezoned. 20 Such changes are "legislative," and
should be made only by amending the ordinance.
10. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 281.
11.

See generally 2

R. ANDERSON, supra note 5,§ 14.16, at 621-22.

12. Id. § 14.07, at 604.

See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 286 (more common); 3
supra note 5, § 14.45, at 3 (less controversial).
14. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5,§ 14.45, at 3.
15. Id. § 14.47.

13.
R.

ANDERSON,

16. Id. § 14.48.
17. Id. § 14.50.
18. Id. §§ 14.55, 14.32, at 670-71.
19. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
§ 108, at 198 (1971).
20. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 5,§ 14.55; 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note
5,§ 14.32, at 670-71.
LAW
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Critics contend that, by departing from these standards, the
boards have usurped legislative prerogatives, 2' undermined public confidence in zoning, 22 deceived persons who buy land without knowing about nearby variances, 23 denied equal treatment to
applicants, 24 permitted destruction of neighborhoods, 25 subverted comprehensive plans, 28 and endangered our democratic insti-

tutions.2 7 Tabulations from numerous jurisdictions reveal that
the approval rate for variance applications consistently ranges
from about 50% to well over 75%.28 Of course, these figures
standing alone are not adequate proof of impropriety, but they are
said to be "grounds for suspicion. 12 9 One distinguished observer
21. See, e.g., Blucher, supra note 4; R. Bryden, supra note 4, at 297;
Alameda County, supra note 4, at 109.
22. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 322.
23. See, e.g., Dallstream & Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 213, 236; Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 339;
Reps, supra note 4, at 282; Souter, Zoning Appeals: How a Board of
Zoning Appeals Functions, 40 MIcH. ST. BAR J., May 1961, at 26; Note,
Zoning Variances, supra note 4, at 1406; Variance Administration in
Indiana,supra note 4, at 241.
24. See, e.g., Babcock, The Unhappy State, supra note 4, at 511, 53637; Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 325, 330-35; Note, Zoning Variances,
supra note 4, at 1406.
25. See, e.g., Neighborhood Decline in Illinois,supra note 4.
26. See, e.g., Dallstream & Hunt, supra note 23, at 227-28 (citing
the common charge that by granting variances too freely boards of adjustment are "undermining the whole zoning structure"); Morris, Toward
Effective Municipal Zoning, 35 WASH. L. Ruv. 534, 577 (1960) ("with
the possible exception of 'spot zoning,' nothing can cause a more general
breakdown of a zoning system than an indiscriminate practice of granting variances"); Reps, supra note 4, at 282 (zoning cannot aid in comprehensive planning "if the board of appeals constantly creates new problems of land use"); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 3 (failure to exercise the
variance power sparingly would "challenge the protective aims of zoning" and "endanger the integrity and desirability of urban neighborhoods"); Wexler, supra note 4, at 74-75 (variations now endanger "the
very system they were designed to protect"); Alameda County, supra
note 4, at 111 ("the power to grant variances should be exercised sparingly because of the detrimental effect of variances upon comprehensive
zoning plans"); Statutory Prerequisites,supra note 4, at 398 (quoting
Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment and
Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959)) (by use of variances
or exceptions an adjustment board may "amend a city ordinance in such
a way as to render it useless, or even nullify the zoning ordinance itsell"); Variance Administration in Indiana, supra note 4, at 241 (since
an excessive number of variances changes the zoning scheme, variances
should be granted only sparingly).
27. See, e.g., Blucher, supra note 4, at 96; Dukeminier, supra note
4, at 322.
28. See 1%. Bryden, supra note 4, at 293 & n.32; Dukeminier, supra
note 4, at 320-21; Syracuse Board, supra note 4, at 634.
29. Reps, supra note 4, at 281.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:769

estimated that 50% of variance decisions are "probably illegal
usurpations of power"; 30 another concluded that the boards "act
illegally in well over half the cases they hear"; 31 and a third says
that "if the courts really superintended ... [the issuance of
variances], upwards from ninety percent of the variances granted
would probably be found invalid. '3 2 Professor Anderson reports
that "[a]n examination of 200 decisions in which the courts
reviewed board of appeals decisions granting or denying applications for use variances discloses that 65% of the variances granted
by boards were reversed by the courts. Only 25% of the board
denials were reversed."3 3 Empirical studies of variance administration in particular jurisdictions are replete with examples of
illegal variances. In Alameda County (California), for example,
one author concluded that in only 15 of the 284 cases in which a
variance was granted by the board had the applicant adduced
evidence of special circumstances sufficient to warrant a variance under the applicable legal standards. 4
This tendency to ignore the legal criteria might be less
distressing if the boards were composed of, or were following the
advice of, professional planners. One might then infer that
illegal variances are granted because the judicial variance criteria
stifle sound planning. But the evidence, as commonly interpreted, suggests otherwise. Typically, a board of adjustment is
composed largely of realtors, small businessmen, and other political appointees who "have the same general perspectives as the
litigants who appear before them," deriving from "identifications with the business community and the propertied class."3 5
These laymen decide cases that sometimes involve complicated
technical evidence-about traffic patterns, sewage disposal capacities, and so on-without paying much attention to planners'
advice. 30 A Kentucky study disclosed that "[o]f 102 requests,
30. Blucher, supra note 4, at 100.
31. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 11 (attributing this view to
MoD_. PRocEDtRE FOR THm AD mNsoTRATioN

oF Zo mG

LEARY,
REGuLATIoNs 10

(1959)).
32.

D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 197.

33. Anderson, supra note 4, at 365.
34. See Alameda County, supra note 4, at 107.
35. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 335; see 2 R. ANDERsoN, supra note
5, § 13.15; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 18. Would the village proletariat
be less receptive to variance applications? The absence of forceful opposition may be a better explanation of applicants' success in this con-

text as in so many others.
36. See Variance Administration in Indiana, supra note 4, at 245.
The planners' recommendations, however, are not necessarily based pri-
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The Board denied
the staff recommended denying 75.
26 ....
The staff recommended granting 25 requests for variances; the Board granted 23 of these requests. '3 7 In Alameda
County, the planning commission or the board rejected the
staff recommendation concerning 208 of the 332 variance applications filed during one year. "Significantly, in each instance
the staff had recommended disapproval of the application because the applicant had not demonstrated circumstances or
hardship justifying a variance." 38 We have, then, copious evidence that zoning boards tend to ignore both the law and expert
advice.
Scholars have also criticized the boards' procedures. Typically, the petitions are badly drafted, perhaps because few
boards insist that applicants even allege facts that would constitute legally adequate grounds for relief.3 9 In some jurisdictions,
applications are processed hurriedly, without adequate time for
careful consideration of individual cases. In Philadelphia, for
example, the board heard from 60 to 70 cases during an average
day, usually spending about four minutes on each case. 40 As in
many administrative proceedings, the judicial safeguards of
testimony under oath and rules of evidence are not generally required,4 ' and rumors abound of arbitrary evidentiary
rulings, 42 ex parte communications, 43 conflicts of interest, 44 favoritism toward acquaintances, 45 and decisions determined by
the quality of the objectors' vocal cords.48 Some boards transcribe the proceedings; but many others place that responsibility
on the parties, so that one who wishes to preserve a record for a
47
possible appeal to the courts must hire his own stenographer.
marily upon analyses of the land use consequences of variances. See
text accompanying note 76 infra.
37. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 329.
38. Alameda County, supra note 4, at 108.
39. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 276; Statutory Prerequisites,
supra note 4, at 404-05.
40. The PhiladelphiaExperience, supra note 4, at 527.
41. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 276-77; The Philadelphia
Experience, supra note 4, at 528. See generally 3 R. AND.asoN, supra note
5, § 16.01.

42. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 4, at 78-79.
43. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 15; Wexler, supra note 4, at
79-81 & n.36.
44. See, e.g., Babcock, The Unhappy State, supra note 4, at 536.
45. Id. at 514.
46. See, e.g., Babcock, Chaos,supra note 4, at 2.
47. See The PhiladelphiaExperience, supra note 4, at 528 (all proceedings are recorded by a stenographer, but the record is transcribed
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The minutes of meetings are frequently skimpy, perhaps reciting
conclusory phrases from the statutory criteria, but without meaningful findings of fact or lucid written explanations of the reasons
for decisions. 48 "When the asserted grounds for variances differ
widely, the repeated use of identical resolutions 49... may be
serving as a substitute for thoughtful consideration.
The shortcomings of individual boards, serious enough in
isolation, are magnified by the absence of statewide procedures.
Richard Babcock observes that in most other administrative
systems the risk of discrimination among applicants is reduced
"by a uniform system of practice and by an administrative ethos,
enforced by a monolithic organization." 50 In zoning, however,
every one of the hundreds of local governments in a state maywithin broad limits-invent its own idiosyncratic rules for conducting hearings. As a result, variance decisions carry the
implicit risk of invidious discrimination, because of the "aboriginal ethical code" of an "atomistic" system that "possesses no
cohesive body of principles, is multiform in its methods for
handling complaints and is composed of constantly proliferating
and unconnected units."51
B.

REFORMS

Most critics have concluded that state legislatures and administrative agencies must bear the main responsibility for improving variance administration. 52 Several reforms have been
only if an appeal is taken to a court); Dukeminier, supra note 4, at
277; Wexler, supra note 4, at 89; Statutory Prerequisites,supra note 4,
at 404.
48. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 277; Shapiro, supra note 4, at
13-14; Sullivan, Flexibility and the Rule of Law in American Zoning Administration, in LAW AND LAND 129, 137 (C. Haar ed. 1964); Wexler,
supra note 4, at 83-84; Statutory Prerequisities,supra note 4, at 404; The
PhiladelphiaExperience, supra note 4, at 529.
49. Alameda County, supra note 4, at 108.
50. Babcock, The Unhappy State, supra note 4, at 511.
51. Id. at 511, 538.
Thus a disgruntled property owner might seek a variation from
the board of appeals, a variation from the city council after a
hearing by the board, or an amendment from the council after
a hearing by the board or by some 'commission or committee,'
depending entirely upon local custom. Neither the courts nor
local officials have sensed any distinction between the functions
of these methods of relief and there are, therefore, whatever the
particular circumstances, almost as many methods for obtaining
ocal relief as there are municipalities and counties in Illinois
which have zoning ordinances.
Id. at 519.
52. For a good discussion of the limitations of litigation as a tech-
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suggested. In jurisdictions where use variances are still permissible, some authors would abolish them, forcing the applicant to
seek legislative or judicial authorization for his proposed use.53
Another popular idea is to change the boards' composition,
particularly by requiring that planners be appointed. 54 Many
other proposals are calculated to make variance hearings more
like trials by requiring legally sufficient petitions, testimony
under oath, rules of evidence, and written decisions that thoroughly explicate the boards' findings and reasoning. 55 Recognizing that the judicial variance criteria are abstract and sometimes confusing, some writers say that the ordinances should
contain detailed criteria for recurrent types of cases. 56 A few of
the most thoughtful commentators go further, arguing that the
judicial variance criteria are too confining. They perceive a
need for dispensations in cases where a variance-although not
meeting all of the present legal criteria-appears to be harmless
57
or even desirable.
The broadest and most plausible reform would be to create
a state land use commission, whose responsibilities could include
hearing appeals from local variance decisions, drafting variance
procedures and criteria, and prescribing substantive rules on
matters of regional or statewide concern. 58 Some of the other
nique for improving zoning, see R.

BABCOCK,

THE ZONING GAME: Mu-

87-171 (1966).
53. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 387; Horack, Emerging

NICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIS

Legal Issues in Zoning, in

AMERICAN

SOCIETY

OF PLANNING

OFFICIALS,

1954, at 146, 151; Reps, supra note 4, at 296; Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 21-22.
54. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 4, at 88; Variance Administration
in Indiana, supra note 4, at 247-49. Some believe that a single administrator should be empowered to grant area variances. gee Reps, supra
note 4, at 296 (suggesting that the lay board should be replaced by a
board of experts or by a single zoning appeals administrator).
55. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 335; Shapiro, supra note
4, at 23; Variance Administration in Indiana, supra note 4, at 251-52.
56. In legal terminology, this would convert the dispensation from
a "variance" to an "exception." See Variance Administrationin Indiana,
supra note 4, at 250.
57. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 339-50 (attributing the variance problem largely to the nature of "Euclidean" zoning); Green,
Rough Justice: Baby or Bath Water? 13 ZONING DIG. 161 (1960) (defending the boards of adjustment); Sullivan, supra note 48, at 142-43 (suggesting less confining legislative standards for variances, combined with
the creation of specialized courts which would be authorized to grant
variances).
PLANNING

58.

See R. BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 166-73.

Babcock suggests the

creation of a state administrative agency with authority: (1) to enforce
a statutory mandate for uniform rules of procedure; (2) to hear all ap-
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proposals require sophisticated draftsmanship and administration, sharpened by the gradual accumulation of expertise. These
are the classic reasons for establishing administrative agencies,
since legislatures lack the time and talent to enact comprehensive
regulations. Without supervision by a state land use agency, no
other reform is likely to be sufficiently uniform, enforceable, and
insulated from local politics. Besides, variances are only part of
the problem of zoning administration, which in turn is only part
of the problem of local zoning. State land use agencies could
integrate variance reforms with other innovations, for instance
by drafting special criteria for variances from particular stateimposed rules.
C.

SoNIE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

On the whole, variance literature has demonstrated a need
for measures designed to create a greater degree of uniformity,
fairness, and adherence to law. As the states continue to assert
greater powers over the substance of land use controls, it seems
both inevitable and proper that they will eventually begin to
establish minimum standards for variance administration.
Doubtless, many political battles lie ahead; but the purely intellectual foundations for reforms have already been laid. We
hardly need to await an article showing that Sauk Centre's board
of adjustment does not closely adhere to the law.
We do, however, need some new kinds of scholarship about
variances. To begin with, most commentators have been content to chastise the boards for deviating from the law, without
seriously questioning whether the judicial tests make sense in the
kinds of cases in which the boards most often ignore them.
We also have not studied the extent to which illegal variances
are attributable to imperfect-or even foolish-substantive zoning
rules. The orthodox analyses are almost wholly legalistic,
simply saying that the boards should not covertly amend the
peals from rulings of local boards that have the power to grant or deny
variances, amendments and special uses; and (3) to grant cash awards
in some cases "where the fairest solution is to sustain the regulation but
to compensate the landowner for the loss." Id. at 168. Babcock would
not limit this agency to the passive role of waiting for disputes to be
brought to it. He says that the agency should have a general rule-making power within the statutory framework so that it could suggest guidelines for local and regional planning decisions. Many of these and related ideas are now embodied in the American Law Institute's MODEL
LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975).
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ordinances, just as they should not alter the judicial criteria for
variances.
Most authors seem to assume that the criteria for granting
variances must be strict because otherwise zoning rules will be
so riddled with exceptions as to be ineffective. Variances, we are
told, were originally meant to be a "safety valve"; but instead
they have "ruptured into a steady 'leak.' 59 On the current of
this metaphor, scholars glide smoothly to Pomeroy's conclusion
that "it doesn't take very many such leaks to exhaust the strength
of the zoning plan."60 Another neat syllogism begins by citing
the venerable maxim that variances should be granted "sparingly." The author then refers to the large numbers of variances
and the high percentages of applications granted as proof that
the boards have ignored the wisdom of zoning's Founding Fa61
thers.
The evidence supporting these ipse dixits is remarkably
sparse: the total number of variances granted in a particular
jurisdiction, the percentage of applications granted, and the
number of illegal variances do not-even taken together-establish anything about the substantive effects of variances. To
illustrate this point, here are a few hypothetical situations.
1.

Voluntary Compliance

Assume that the Village of Fraser's zoning ordinance requires that buildings be set back at least 30 feet from roads.
Prior to adoption of this rule, the voluntary setback pattern was
as follows: of every 100 houses on lots contiguous to roads,
one was built within 30 feet of the road. To simplify the
arithmetic, suppose that this one was always located 20 feet
from the road, while the others were always exactly 30 feet
back. This voluntary pattern, we will assume, had persisted
for many years and was not evolving. After adoption of the
setback rule, the setback pattern did not change. Still, one of
every 100 landowners wished to build 20 feet from the road.
Invariably, these people obtained variances authorizing them to
59. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 9. For a collection of similar apprehensions, see the authorities cited in note 26 supra.
60. Pomeroy, Losing the Effectiveness of Zoning Through Leakage,
in PLANNINa AND CIVIC COMMaNT 8-9 (1941), quoted in Reps, supra note
4, at 281.
61. See Variance Administration in Indiana, supra note 4, at 244 &
nn.28 & 29.
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do exactly what they wished. All of the variances were illegal.
In such circumstances, the number of setback variances
might be very small, and yet the effectiveness of the rule as a
method for changing conduct would have been wholly vitiated
by variances. But in another, more important sense, the rule
may not have failed. We presumably care more about achieving
a certain result than about whether the law has helped us to
achieve it. If we achieve it by voluntary conduct, so much the
better. Fraser's setback rule, though impotent as a coercive
force, is almost entirely successful as an aspiration.
Let's assume that the rule's purpose was simply to prevent
obstruction of motorists' views of the road. The question then is
whether an occasional ten-foot departure from the rule appreciably increases the likelihood of accidents. If not, then the
board's leniency, however culpable it may be from a legal or
ethical point of view, does not appear to be responsible for
thwarting any purely substantive policy.
If, on the other hand, the landowner has not irrevocably
committed himself to compliance with the rule in question (as
by building beyond the setback line), his "compliance" may be
misleading. Suppose that a county has prohibited alterations of
lakeshore marshes. If 95 of the 100 landowners affected by
this rule have not sought dispensations, but five sought and
received rezonings or variances, then we have grounds for fearing that eventually all of the marshes may be destroyed. In this
hypothetical, the 95 "complying" landowners are free to change
their minds, and, if they do, the record provides no basis for
assuming that the board will deny their requests for relief.
2.

MultiplierEffects

In our first example, we assumed that the setback variance
pattern was static. In some circumstances, it may be dynamic.
For example, many critics say that illegal use variances commonly generate other use variances granted to applicants who
cite the earlier dispensations as evidence that the district is not
purely residential, until eventually whole neighborhoods change
from residential to commercial. 62 Similarly, the original setback
variances in our first hypothetical case, though they look insignificant, may generate a string of dispensations that will drasti62. See, e.g., Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, supranote 4, at 480.

19771

VARIANCES

cally undermine the rule. On the other hand, this process may
be less common than the critics suppose. The causal relationship between successive variances may be more apparent than
real; and no one has shown that the multiplier effects of illegal
variances are one of the important causes of, for example,
neighborhood deterioration. Instead, the commentators have
relied on anecdotes and surmises.
3.

The Bad Rule

Fraser's zoning scheme does not provide for inexpensive
housing. Instead, by imposing large minimum lot sizes, prohibiting apartment houses, and using other familiar devices, the
Village has preserved its character as a prosperous suburb.
Modern commentators regularly condemn such "exclusionary
zoning," arguing forcefully that every metropolitan community
should accept its fair share of low-income housing.6 3 The
proper way to do this, of course, is by amending the ordinance,
not by granting illegal variances for high-density developments.
In addition to being illegal, such variances are less democratic,
less systematic, and conceivably more likely to be granted or
withheld for invidious reasons than are legislative amendments.
Nevertheless, if we find that Fraser's board of adjustment
has granted illegal variances from undesirable rules, a full accounting of its performance should reflect the flaws of the
rules, as well as the flaws of the manner in which the rules have
been modified. More pragmatically, our first task should be to
improve the rules, rather than to devise reforms whose main
64
purpose is to make variances more difficult to obtain.
4.

The PoliticalSafety Valve

According to zoning theorists, variances should function
largely as a legal safety valve,6 5 preventing unconstitutional
"takings" of private property. In fact, they may more often be a
political safety valve. After all, many laws survive only because

63. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN,
LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s

EXcLUSIONARY

ZONING:

3-6, 47-54 (1973).

64. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808
The Court indicated that use variances-many or most of them
ently illegal-have served to circumvent undesirable prohibitions
apartment houses in municipalities throughout New Jersey. 67
181 n.12, 336 A.2d at 729 n.12.

65. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 9.

of Mt.
(1975).
apparagainst
N.J. at

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:769

they usually are not enforced. These rules are not necessarily
"bad"; they may merely be unpopular. But for practical purposes, the appropriate analysis is similar. In principle, the rule
should be changed by the local legislature. If, instead, it is being
whittled away by variances, it seems better-or at least more
realistic-to change the rule before trying to curb the variances.
5.

Sacrifices on the Altar of Uniformity and Predictability

The Board authorized Widow Green to use one room of
her house as a small antique shop, an impermissible use in the
residential district where she lived.66 They were swayed by her
financial plight, her understandable desire to remain in the old
family home, and supportive testimony by friendly neighbors.
Nevertheless, since her problem was due to personal financial
and psychological needs, not to peculiarities of her land, this
variance was illegal. Still, it seems innocuous, at worst, and
might even be described as a small triumph for justice and
rational regulation. 67 The situation resembles the "bad rule"
problem insofar as it reveals an imperfection in the crude
generalization that the residential district expresses. But here
the rule should not necessarily be redrafted. It may be impossible to anticipate all the situations in which exceptions are appropriate. Perhaps the variance criteria should be changed; but
again the problem may be that all generalizations are imperfect,
not that new generalizations are needed. As in every legal context, we may applaud flexible rough justice; or we may instead
regretfully conclude that some people should be sacrificed on the
altar of uniformity and predictability. Whichever position one
adopts, platitudes about destruction of comprehensive plans do
not fairly reflect the conflicting values that are at stake.
The conventional empirical studies of variance administration are reasonably rigorous in determining whether the boards
66. "[M]ost communities have been willing to permit limited 'selfhelp' occupations to be carried on in residential neighborhoods. These
are commonly identified in zoning ordinances as 'home occupations.' A
'home occupation' is a commercial use in a house that does not appear
to change the primary residential character." R. BABcocx , supra note
52, at 142. In the hypothetical case we are, of course, assuming that
Fraser's ordinance does not contain such a provision. For a series of
similar hypothetical cases, including this one, see Green, supra note 57.
67. In this type of case, the traditional variance criteria produce results that are indefensible except perhaps by reference to the desiderata
of uniformity and predictability.
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apply the law, but wildly speculative about whether their failure
to do so seriously jeopardizes important substantive goals. The
longest explicit discussion of this topic is a student note about
protection of Chicago's "middle-aged residential areas, bordering on slums, from social and physical deterioration."6 8 This
piece, published in 1953, relies extensively upon reports of
municipal committees as authority for a series of propositions
that can be summarized as follows: Chicago's neighborhoods
are rapidly becoming blighted; although "[t]here is a host of
reasons"6 9 for this phenomenon, "[o]ne of the principal causes
of premature neighborhood decay is the mixing of incompatible
land uses"; 70 zoning amendments and variances often authorize
such mixing; there have been 1,020 amendments and 2,640
variances since 1942; 7 1 if dispensed by "an enlightened planning
body" even such large numbers of dispensations "would not be
unduly harmful"; 72 but in Chicago they were granted by politicians who generally didn't ask for planners' advice and often
voted to advance "narrow ward interests"; 73 with the result that
although "[i]ndvidual variations may be well grounded . . . it
is clear that such a large number of them encourages neighborhood decline. ' 74 It all amounts to one non sequitur: "I don't
trust the politicians who are making these decisions, and therefore I fear that unjustifiable rezonings and variances are a significant cause of Chicago's expanding slums."
The Dukeminier and Stapleton study of the Lexington
Board of Adjustment is much more sophisticated, and contains a
thoughtful analysis of discrepancies between the board's decisions and the relevant law. Concerning the effects of variances,
however, these authors speak with uncharacteristic imprecision:
[T]here is some evidence at hand indicating that a high proportion of these variances had an undesirable effect upon the community plan. The planning staff, which is supposed to have
specialized knowledge about the interrelation of land uses,
68. Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, supra note 4, at 470 (footnote
omitted).
69. Id. at 471 n.9.
70. Id. at 471.
71. Id. at 475, 481.
72. Id. at 475.
73. Id. at 474, 480. One is left with the surprising impression that
neighborhood conservation was not one of the "narrow ward interests"
that the politicians tried to advance.
74. Id. at 481. The author does not seem to have considered the
possibility that "neighborhood decline" may have some desirable consequences. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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recommended that 26 variances be granted and 75 denied. The
Board granted 76 and denied 26, which is almost a precise reversal of the staff ratio. Other evidence can be found in the
sign variances granted. No observer of Lexington over the past
few years can fail to note the increasing crass ugliness of the
city and the increase in nonconforming signs of every kind. On
the New Circle Road alone more than-sixty signs have been
erected too close to the road, too large, or too high in the air.
Three new shopping centers-Idle Hour, Gardenside, and Zandale-have had the symmetry of their design spoiled by nonconforming signs. In addition, in an explosion of capitalist enterprise advertising signs have spilled out on the surrounding
green farmland, which Westbrook Pegler, who is not given to
encomiums, called "the sweetest countryside on earth." The
ultimate social and economic cost to the community of the
Board's sign dispensations will be difficult to measure. But undesirable effects may already be observed. If the other variances
granted have as unfortunate effects as the sign variances, the
integrity of the comprehensive plan may be in more danger than
we think.75
Surely, this reasoning leaves something to be desired. The
planners may have been relatively strict because they loved their
plans, or because their recommendations followed the law more
closely than the board was willing to do,1 6 or simply because
they accepted the unproven assumption that variances gravely
undermine the substantive goals of zoning. Granted, illegal sign
variances may have contributed to aesthetic degradation in Lexington County. Still, one wonders how much different the area
would look without these variances. Take, for example, New
Circle Road, where the authors seem to think variances have had
a great impact. Elsewhere in the article, they explain that, after
an "epic battle," the land adjacent to this road was zoned for
business.
Today-eight years later-New Circle Road is lined with driveins purveying beds, burgers, booze, and Bardot, as well as more
durable goods-all advertised by winking, blinking, or fixed
illuminated signs. The only part the Board of Adjustment has
played in this garish
development is in granting bulk variances,
77
usually for signs.
In such a place, how much aesthetic degradation can accurately
be attributed to the fact that about sixty signs "have been erected
too close to the road, too large, or too high in the air"? This is not
to say that urban sign regulations are worthless, or that variances
are altogether harmless along a commercial highway. The point
75. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 338-39.
76. To the extent that this occurs, statistics about the frequency
with which boards reject staff recommendations add nothing to the proposition that the boards often fail to apply the law.
77. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 294.
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is that illegal sign variances may be a negligible cause of the
appearance of a honkytonk strip or even of the aesthetic impact
of the signs along the strip. Billboards that deface beautiful
countryside are another matter; but here again the authors do
not provide evidence that enables the reader to imagine-even
roughly-the difference between the appearance of Lexington
County with and without sign variances generally or illegal ones
in particular.
To be fair, the quoted passage was only a minor part of
a painstaking and judicious study of variance administration.
The authors' major concern was the quality of justice in
variance proceedings-obviously an important topic. But there
are purposes for which information about the substantive
effects of variances would also be valuable. Consider, for
example, the responsibilities of a state agency with plenary
powers to fashion substantive and procedural requirements for
local zoning. As state planners draft minimum standards for
the substantive contents of local ordinances, they must sometimes calculate, among other things, the point at which a rule
becomes so strict that-without systematic, stringent, and perhaps politically unacceptable controls over variances-the rule
will be nullified by dispensations. 78 If the planners are empowered to draft variance criteria, they must also decide whether
those criteria should differ from the judicial tests. Apart from
apprehensions about "destruction of zoning," it is difficult to see
why an applicant's "purely personal" problems (to cite one
familiar hornbook rule) are wholly immaterial to whether he
should receive a variance. Why not listen to the landowner's
evidence of, for example, independent financial distress? 79
Again, it would be useful to know whether leniency would
endanger important substantive interests. Perhaps the answer
differs from one rule to another. There is no reason to suppose
a priori that the judicial distinction between use and area variances is sacrosanct. Maybe some rules of both types would be
effective only with exceptionally strict variance criteria, while
others would achieve their purposes even if the criteria were
more lenient than the "practical difficulties" test. The courts
probably cannot make such refined distinctions; but an administrative agency might eventually be able to do so, at least for a
few rules that have created unusually vexatious variance problems.
78.

See Table H, at p. 828 infra.

79. See Sullivan, supra note 48, at 129, 138 & n.19.
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If we knew more about the effects of variances, it would
also be easier to appraise proposals for state review of local
decisions. Without a colossal bureaucracy, a state agency cannot carefully examine more than a tiny percentage of variance
cases. How should those cases be selected? One possibility is
for the state to reserve a veto power over variances from land use
controls that it has required local governments to adopt.80 This
reform would make sense only if the agency were primarily
concerned about the substantive impacts of variances, rather
than the fairness of variance administration. For the state's
interest in fairness is equally great in cases where a variance
from a purely local rule has been improperly denied, as it is in
cases where a variance from a state-imposed rule has been
improperly granted.
Another obvious possibility is to allow aggrieved parties to
challenge the local boards' decisions before a state board of
zoning appeals. 8 ' Such administrative appeals might be cheaper and quicker than ordinary litigation, and a state board's
decisions might make local procedures fairer and more uniform.
But it is unclear whether private appeals would suffice to
preserve the substantive integrity of every state-imposed rule.
Frequently, no one objects to the local variance; and, of course,
even if someone does object he may not take the trouble to
appeal.8 2 For instance, one wonders whether improper variances from state-imposed billboard regulations-individually
trivial, but perhaps cumulatively significant-could be sufficiently curbed by private appeals. If not, the best solution might be
to augment private appeals by providing for automatic state
review of variances from rules that are thought to be important,
80. This was done with land use controls promulgated under the
Minnesota Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, MAfN-.STAT. § 104.31-.40 (1976);
MINN. REG. NR 81(b) (3) (1974). Under such a narrow statute, the
political and administrative problems created by a state veto power
may well prove to be manageable.
81. See note 58 supra.
82. See Statutory Prerequisites,supra note 4, at 406-07 (protesters
were present in only 23.7% of the cases before the board of adjustment); The Philadelphia Experience, supra note 4, at 542 (protesters
appeared in about 38% of the cases). In rural areas or with respect to area variances, the percentages of protesters might be lower.
It remains to be seen whether administrative appeals to a state board
will be more frequent than litigation challenging variance decisions,
which, as a percentage of the decisions, is rare. See, e.g., Dukeminier,
supra note 4, at 278 (of 167 cases studied, only two were appealed).
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susceptible to significant erosion by variances, and inadequately
enforced by private objectors. Or the state might undertake to
draft exceptionally precise criteria for such variances, hoping
that the local boards will follow these criteria more conscientiously than they have obeyed the relatively abstract and diffuse
strictures of judicial decisions.
Obviously, one essay cannot furnish universal answers to
such questions. Instead, this Article will suggest methods for
gathering and appraising relevant information. The first step is
to study the rules, as thoroughly and critically as variances have
always been studied.
83
II. DRAFTING THE RULES

Until recently, most of Minnesota's 87 counties had done
little or nothing to regulate development around the state's
famous "10,000 lakes. '8 4 During the late 1960's, however, land
83. Many of the conclusions expressed herein are based on notes
of countless conversations between the author and officials of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR), whose generosity and
candor made this portion of the Article possible. Unless otherwise attributed, the interpretations of official motivation are my own sense of
what these officials told me. Some of the interviews occurred (and
some of the documents cited were published) at times when the DNR
was titled the "Department of Conservation." To avoid confusion, the
Department is referred to as the DNR, except in citing the titles of
documents that have not been reissued since the Department's title was
changed.
The DNR's Shorelands Unit was part of the Waters Section, which
was a component of the Division of Waters, Soils and Minerals. James
Menter and Michael Hambrock, formerly of the Shorelands Unit, were
the primary drafters respectively of the statewide standards and the
formulas for classifying lakes. Eugene Hollenstein was the director
of the Waters Section. Eugene Gere was, during the drafting period,
the Director of the Division of Waters, Soils and Minerals. All interviews with these individuals were held in Minneapolis or St. Paul, Minnesota. To avoid repetitious explanations of the place of the interview
and interviewees' official positions, citations to conversations with these
officials will contain only the surname and the date.
84. For example, a state official estimated that in 1971 most counties had not yet begun to regulate the placement and construction of individual on-site sewage disposal systems in shoreland areas. The state
also had no applicable regulations. Interview with Fred Heisel, Director
of the Division of Environmental Health, Minnesota Dep't of Health, in
Minneapolis (Jan. 11, 1971). In 1970, only 24 counties had zoning or
subdivision regulations; most of these were rudimentary. Hambrock Interview (July 14i 1970), see note 83 supra.
The "10,000 lakes" figure is inexact because, of course, it depends
on one's definition of the size and depth of a '"ake." There are about

15,291 lake basins of ten or more acres.
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use and pollution began to receive enormous -publicity. In
Minnesota, much of the publicity concerned pollution of lakes,
particularly by masses of algae, which often transformed pleasant beaches into scummy messes. Many people attributed this
nuisance partly to lakeshore septic tanks, whose effluents tend to
fertilize nearby waters.
In Wisconsin, where similar trends were evident, the legislature responded by authorizing a novel system of statewide
shoreland zoning. Under this statute, passed in 1966,85 all counties were required to regulate shoreland development in accordance with minimum standards to be promulgated by the State
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Three years later, the
Minnesota Legislature passed a basically identical statute: the
Shoreland Management Act of 1969.86
Like its Wisconsin predecessor, the Shoreland Management
Act applied only to unincorporated lands within 1,000-foot wide
corridors around the circumferences of lakes and 300 feet from
the edges of rivers and streams.8 7 The Act did not dictate
specific land use controls. Instead, it delegated this task to the
Department of Natural Resources, which was directed to prepare
minimum standards for the contents of county ordinances,
including but not limited to the following: (a) [t]he area of a
lot and length of water frontage suitable for a building site;
(b) the placement of structures in relation to shorelines and
roads; (c) the placement and construction of sanitary and waste
disposal facilities; (d) designation of types of land uses; (e)
changes in bottom contours of adjacent public waters; (f) presATION, BUREAU oF PLANNING, MINNESOTA OUTDOOR RECREATION PLAN1968, at 18 (1969).
85. 1965 Wis. Laws ch. 614, at 1089-1113, as amended, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 59.971 (West Supp. 1976). See generally Kusler, Water Quality

Protection for Inland Lakes in Wisconsin: A Comprehensive Approach
to Water Pollution,1970 WIs. L. REv. 35, 59-78.
86. MINN. STAT. §§ 105.485, 394.25(2) (1969), as amended, MINN.
STAT. §§ 105.485, 394.25(2) (1976).
87. MINN. STAT. § 105.485(2) (1969), as amended, Alu. STAT. §
105.485(2), (6) (1976). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971(1) (West
Supp. 1976). Because running water tends to purify itself, septic tank

pollution generally affects rivers less than lakes. Thus, the regulated
corridors adjacent to rivers are narrower than those around lakes. Gere
Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. Cf. Kusler, supra note 85, at

37. -Municipalities were excluded from the regulatory scheme, partly for
political reasons, and partly because most of the undeveloped land
where zoning has its greatest impact is in unincorporated areas governed

by counties. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. The
Minnesota Act was later amended to cover municipalities. See MnN.
(amending MINN. STAT. § 105.485(2)
STAT. § 105.485(2), (6) (1976)
(1969)).
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ervation of natural shorelands through the restriction of land
uses; (g) variances from the minimum standards and criteria;
and (h) a model ordinance.88
The DNR's role, then, was to draft two documents: statewide
standards prescribing the essential contents of local shoreland
zoning ordinances, and an optional model ordinance illustrating
one way to express the minimum standards in suitable language.8 9 The statutory deadline for county ordinances was July
1, 1972. If a county failed to adopt an adequate ordinance
by then, the DNR was required to "adapt the model ordinance to
the county."90
A. THE PLANNERS' IDEALS
The Department's regulatory aspirations were vividly portrayed by a picture of "ideal lakeshore development," published
by the DNR about a year before passage of the Shoreland Management Act.91
The text accompanying the picture explains that this hypothetical lake is typical of those on which intensive shoreline
development has already occurred. It has an area of 500 acres,
with an average depth of about 18 feet and "good chemical
fertility." 92 The eastern shore, which has natural sandy beaches, is already developed: "Many trees were removed and sloping bank areas were leveled to accommodate the building of
homes." 93 But much can still be saved. Although fishing and
boating have increased "markedly," there is still enough space;
plenty of fish are being caught; and the water is "clear except for
' 94
a short period of 'dog days' in August.
88. MINN.STAT. § 105.485(3) (1976).
89. Although the statute is inexplicit on this point, the DNR treated
the model ordinance as an optional example of appropriate language.
MTINNESOTA DEP'T Or NATURAL RESOURCES, PROCEDURAL GUIDE FOR THE ImPLEMENTATION OF COUNTY SHORELAND ORDINANCES 14 (undated) [hereinafter cited as DNR, PROCEDURAL GUIDE].
90.
91.

MINN.STAT. § 105.485(4) (1976).
Skrypek, Beautiful . . . Or Blighted? An Apprehensive Look
At Our Lakeshores, THE CONSERVATION VOLUNTEER, May-June 1968, at

1, 5 (official publication, Minnesota DNR) [hereinafter cited as Skrypek]. The author thanks the DNR for permitting reproduction of the
illustration at p. 790 infra. It should be stressed that the article summarized here did not purport to reflect official policies; its author was
not one of the drafters of the statewide standards later promulgated by
the DNR. Nevertheless, the reader will see similarities between his ideas
and those of the drafters.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id,
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The lake's future depends upon what happens to the undeveloped shoreline where fish "spawn in protected shallow bays
and for the most part live and feed along the weedy areas of the
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lee shore." 95 Here too "ducks feed on the submerged aquatic
vegetation and use the emergent vegetation along shore as cover
for protection of themselves and their young. Many other
animals use the marshy shoreline, some of the more common
being the muskrat, turtle, frog, heron, bittern and red-winged
blackbird." 96 Further development would destroy this weedy
habitat. More houses might also ruin the lake for everyone, by
fouling the beaches with algae nourished by "nutrient rich effluents from septic tanks. '97 Eventually, this pollution would
even kill the game fish 8s The time has come for regulations.
The author of the lakeshore plan suggests that future development should be clustered "away from the shoreline with common beach and boat-launching areas developed for those people
not living directly on the lake."9 9 The government should buy
some of the shore in order, for example, to protect spawning
areas. The rest should be zoned to "preserve a certain percentage of shoreline in its natural state" and to "make shoreline
development an orderly process."'100 As examples of possible
regulations, the article mentions minimum lot sizes, coupled
with building and septic tank drainfield setbacks.
With a little less emphasis on fish and wildlife, and perhaps
a bit more legal sophistication, 10 1 this analysis of lakeshore
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 7.
98. The ability of fish to withstand pollution generally, and excessive algae resulting from nutrient enrichment in particular, varies among
species. As a rule, fish are not adversely affected by nutrients until algal
abundance reduces the supply of dissolved oxygen below the requirements of a particular species. Unfortunately, the rarest and most
coveted game fish (salmonids, such as trout) are the most sensitive to
this pollution, followed by other game fish, and finally by such lowly
species as catfish and carp, which often thrive in badly polluted waters.
On the other hand, game fish other than salmonids usually can withstand
considerable nutrient pollution, well past the point at which the algae
become unpleasant to humans, including fishermen, so that lakes with a
serious "algae problem" often have excellent fishing. Indeed, if our purpose were simply to increase fish production, we would often wish to
fertilize lakes because algae are a basic link in the food chain. For this
reason, the proprietors of commercial fish ponds (and of farm ponds)
often fertilize them, just as they would croplands. Interview with Dr.
Joseph Shapiro, Associate Director, Limnological Research Center, University of Minnesota, in Minneapolis (May 11, 1976). See also Larkin
& Northcote, Fish as Indices of Eutrophication, in NATIONAL ACADEmY
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CoRREcTIvEs 256
OF ScmNcEs, EumoPImcAToN:
(1969) [hereinafter cited as EUTROPHICATION].

99. Skrypek, supranote 91, at 4, 6.
100. Id. at 8.
101. The idea that zoning can "preserve a certain percentage of
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development could have been written by any planner. Although the author emphasizes conservation, his design implicitly
acknowledges other values. One shore is already developed,
with sandy beaches and conventional lots. There is a public
access. Even on the western shore, development will continue,
with a beach and a parking lot, but the houses will be clustered,
leaving much of the natural environment intact.
These
themes-cluster development, minimum lot sizes, protected
marshes, building and septic tank setbacks, and preservation of
shoreline trees-appear repeatedly in literature about rural planning.10 2 They are the planners' ideals.
What follows is an account of the odyssey of those ideals
through the labyrinth of the regulatory process.

B.

THE PERVASIVE CONSTRAINTS

Although it did not authorize land acquisition, 03 the
Shoreland Management Act was broad enough-by its termsto authorize the DNR to draft nearly any sort of regulation,
subject only to the constitutional limits of all zoning. But most
of the statewide standards never approached the constitutional
line. By and large, the DNR adopted simple, old-fashioned
zoning provisions-setbacks, a sanitary code, procedures for
shoreline in its natural state" is, of course, a major oversimplification.
Compare State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) with Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See generally Kusler,
Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MImN. L.
REv. 1 (1972).
102. See, e.g., SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING CoMMISSION, FLOODLAND AND SHORELAND DEVELOPMENT GUID 25, 73 (1968).
103. "One-fourth, or more than 12.5 million acres of Minnesota's 51.2
million acres are publicly-owned." WATER RESOURCES COORDINATING COMMI'rTEE, MINNESOTA

STATE

PLANNING

AGENCY,

MINNESOTA WATER AND

RELATED LAND RESOURCES: FIRST ASSESSMENT 199 (1970). As a glance
at any road map will confirm, however, these public lands are not, as
a rule, distributed in strips along the shores of lakes and streams. Instead, they are generally huge rectangular tracts (parks, state forests,
and so on) created for purposes other than conservation of shorelands.
Interview with Philip Olfelt, Assistant Attorney General, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of Minnesota, in St. Paul (May 11, 1976). In some
counties, there is so much public land that local citizens rail against "destruction of our tax base," and yet-in these same counties-the shores
of the most beautiful lakes and rivers are often privately owned. Id.
For rivers, this situation has been partially rectified by passage of the
Minnesota Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 104.31-.40 (1976);
see note 80 supra. There is no comparable statute pertaining to lakes,
although, of course, lakes wholly within parks and similar areas are generally well preserved,
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approving subdivision plats, and the like. The essential conservatism of the regulations was due to several constraints. First,
the DNR's minimum standards had to be sufficiently simple for
administration by rural county governments, many of which
lacked experience with even the crudest forms of zoning, 10 4 and
few of which were likely to hire a large planning staff. In Cook
County, north of Lake Superior-where there are more bears
than lawyers-who needs a floating zone? Quite deliberately,
therefore, the DNR's planners avoided every sort of procedural
complexity. Second, the planners were inhibited by the novelty
of statewide shoreland zoning. Even in Wisconsin the system
was new, and the other states had no significant regulations or
advice to offer.'0 5 Third, the DNR realized that without considerable support from rural officials and landowners, their standards would fail.1 6 Wisely, the authors of the shorelands bill
104. See note 84 supra. In rural Minnesota, some zoning administrators are still not fully versed in the intricacies of land use controls
or even of their own ordinances. Perhaps this is partly because some
of them augment their meager salaries by concurrently pursuing other
careers. Interview with David Milles, Senior Hydrologist, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of Minnesota, in St. Paul (May 5, 1976). Anticipating such difficulties, the drafters of the statewide standards tried to
draft "something simple enough so that the counties could adopt it and
get going." They rejected, for example, complicated ideas involving
separate rules for each watershed, in part because of doubts about the
counties' ability to administer elaborate systems. Menter Interview
(Oct. 21, 1970), see note 83 supra.
105. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra.
106. Although it later passed by generous margins on the floors of
both houses, the shorelands bill had nearly been killed in legislative
committees. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. The
following colloquy at the public hearing on the DNR's proposed standards exemplifies the confusion and hostility of some landowners:
Mr. AMBROSE KOTTSCHADE [Executive Director, Property
Owners League of Minnesota]: "Then if there is [sic] not
enough trees, then the provision is also in there where the
county can put in streets and so forth, if the county so desires,
and this is the latter part of the bill [sic]."
Mr. JAMES MENTER [responding for the DNR]: "You mean
for the subdivision regulations. These apply only to the platted
subdivisions."
Mr. KOTTSCHADE: "Only to platted subdivisions, not where it
is by metes and bounds, however. Platted subdivisions."
Mr. MENTER: "I don't understand. You are saying that the
county has the right to put in roads."
Mr. KOTTSCHADE: "I am just going by what you read in
that."
Mr. MENTER: "If you could refer us to the exact section, it
would be a little more convenient."
Mr. KOTTSCHADE: "I wish I could. It had to do with roads
and sewers and so forth. It was the latter part. But, again,
I wish I had my bill with, my copy with and I could refer
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had kept its language simple and bland, enabling the legislature
to delegate power without having to endorse any particular regulations. 10 7 Consequently, it was the bureaucrats, not the politicians, who had to decide which rules were politically acceptable.
If they misjudged popular sentiments, the legislature might
overreact, slashing appropriations or even repealing the statute.
Conscious of its political accountability, the DNR discarded
some ideas as too controversial. One such notion was to regulate shoreland farming. Scientifically, it makes no sense to
regulate septic tanks while ignoring agricultural land use, which
in some regions of the state appears to be a greater source of
pollution. 1

8

Then too, the edge of a lake sometimes blends

imperceptibly into marshes and sloughs that a farmer may wish
to drain. Thus, if the hypothetical lake map had depicted
farmlands, they-like the houses in the cluster developmentwould probably have been separated from the lake by a buffer of
marshes and trees. But farmers, of course, are an extraordinarily powerful pressure group. Already embroiled in a largely
futile effort to curb agricultural drainage of wetlands, 10 9 and
well aware that in many counties opposition from farmers could
force local governments to resist shoreland zoning, the DNR
decided that it would be imprudent to try to control farming
around lakes. 110 Hence, the statewide standards neither restrict
to but you did mention about the streets and so forth could be
put in. In other words, then the property owner is under a constant surveillance and the property owner in essence if this bill
were to be adopted and become law, the property owner really
does not own the property but he is at the mercy of the county
planing agency, the-what did you say the other one was?"
Mr. MENTER: "The Board of Adjustment."
Mr. KOTTSCHADE: "Okay, and the Minnesota Pollution
Agency and the Minnesota Department of Health, and so forth.
Thank you."
In the Matter of the Proposed Adoption of Rules of the Commissioner
of Conservation Prescribing Model Standards and Criteriafor the Subdivision, Use and Development of Shoreland in UnincorporatedAreas,
Transcript of Proceeding held at the State Office Building, St. Paul,
50-51 (Apr. 29, 1970) (on file at the Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, Division of Waters) [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
107. "The more detail you get into on something like that, the more
argument you get." Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra.
108. See, e.g., BoRcHET, MuIFSOTA's LAKEsHORE, PART I: SUAvAnY
REPORT Or THE iVIINNESOTA LAKESHORE DEVELOPMENT STUDY 27-28 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LDS, PART 1].
109. See, e.g., Schwermann v. Reinhart, 296 Minn. 340, 210 N.W.2d
33 (1973); Stevens v. State, 291 Minn. 263, 190 N.W.2d 482 (1971).
110. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. When the
primary drafter was asked by a student why the statewide standards did
not proscribe grazing in some shoreland areas, he replied: "I can tell
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agricultural pollution nor prohibit drainage of wetlands."1
Turning from pollution to aesthetics, the DNR originally
planned to regulate tree-cutting. Under early drafts of their
proposed rules, removal of natural vegetation was to be controlled within a narrow corridor around each lake. Inside the
corridor, landowners could eliminate trees to make room for
houses and other essential structures. Thereafter, they could
clearcut 25% of the strip of trees between the house and
the lake to create a view of the lake. In the remaining 75%
of the strip, the DNR proposed that "cutting shall leave sufficient cover to screen cars, dwellings, and other structures,
except boathouses, piers, docks and marinas, from view from the
lake." 112 This sounds fair enough; but it was vigorously criticized. Some landowners railed against the proposal." 3 Perhaps more important, zoning administrators argued that treecutting rules would be virtually impossible to enforce and would
consequently detract from the ordinances' credibility. 1 4 Troubled by these objections, the DNR compromised, transferring
you've never been to a public hearing and had some farmer ask whether
he has to put diapers on his cows."

see note 83 supra.

Menter Interview (Apr. 8, 1975),

111. However, some provisions may indirectly preserve wetlands.
See MiNN. REG. CONS 72(b) (5) (aa), 73(c)(2), (3), 74(a) (1970). In
addition, the optional model ordinance contains suggested land use districts, one of which is a "Special Protection District," in which the permitted uses are severely restricted so as to preclude most kinds of alterations of the natural topography. See MINN. REG. CONS 77(2.3) (1970).
After examining the DNR's file of county ordinances and official maps,

however, we found only a few counties that seemed to have (1) in-

cluded this or a comparable provision in the ordinance, (2) defined the
permitted uses so restrictively as to preclude residential development,
and (3) included private land within such districts. Consequently, it
seems pointless to discuss whether such regulations, as applied to shoreland marshes, would be an unconstitutional "taking." See note 101
supra.
112. Statewide Standards and Criteria for Management of Shoreland
Areas of Minnesota, Preliminary Draft, MINN. REG. CONS 73(b) (4)
(Mar. 24, 1970) (on file with the author).
113. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. Timber companies also objected. Menter Interview (Apr. 8, 1975), see note 83 supra.
(Perhaps they regarded the proposal as a potentially dangerous precedent.)
114. Local administrators were the most influential opponents.
Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. Rules against treecutting are sometimes extremely difficult to enforce even when the government has compensated the landowner by purchasing a scenic easement. See Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification
Program,45 DEN. L.J. 167, 182-83 (1968).
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the restrictions on tree-cutting from the mandatory statewide
standards to the optional model ordinances, 115 so that each
county could decide for itself whether to regulate tree-cutting.
The planners were constantly aware that they would have
to explain their rules to skeptical landowners, zoning officials,
politicians, and-ultimately-to trial judges in rustic courthouses. 11 6 Almost invariably, they eschewed rules that would
be difficult to defend. Perhaps the best example is a large
but hidden gap in the statewide regulations.
The statute
required the DNR to promulgate, among other things, standards
for zoning in the narrow sense of the word: districts where
certain land uses (residential, commercial, and so on) would be
permissible, while others would be forbidden." 7 Formally, the
agency complied with this directive. It assigned a classification
to every lake and stream and required the counties to create
"land use districts based on the compatability of the designated
type of land use with the public waters classification." ' s But
this requirement-like all the minimum standards-could be
enforced only by disapproving those county ordinances that
failed to comply with it, after which the Department would have
to "adapt the model ordinance to the county." The question
115. MixnN. REG. CONS 77 (4.31) (1970). Retained in the mandatory
standards was a provision stating that "[n] atural vegetation in shoreland
areas shall be preserved insofar as practical and reasonable to retard surface runoff and soil erosion, to utilize excess nutrients in the soil to alleviate pollution problems, and to provide sufficient cover to screen cars,
dwellings, and other structures from view from the lake." Mnhn. REG.
CONS 73(c) (1) (1970). This provision was intended to indicate the
DNR's concern, without requiring recalcitrant counties to adopt specific
rules about the subject. Menter Interview (Apr. 8, 1975), see note 83
supra. Analysis of the approved county ordinances that were on file at
the DNR in November 1974, reveals that 15% of them say nothing about
preservation of natural vegetation; 34% contain the model ordinance's
language verbatim or with minor rewording; 4% copied the vague exhortation of the statewide standards; and the rest (about 47%) have provisions that differ appreciably from both the statewide standards and the
model ordinance. Although about 82% of all counties enacted a fairly
specific provision, only 60% of the ten counties with the most lakes did
so, perhaps because these counties were more apprehensive about enforcement problems.
116. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. See also
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. Rav. 157, 183-86 (1963). The article
includes an excerpt from a trial transcript that illustrates nicely the
dangers of subjecting a non-resident "expert" to cross examination.
117. MTINN. STAT. § 105.485(3) (1969), as amended, MliNN. SmT. §
105.485(3) (1976).
118.

MnmN.REG.CONS 71 (1970).
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was: On what grounds can the DNR tell a county that its land
19
and over 10,use districts are inadequate? With 85 counties'
000 lakes and streams, it was clearly infeasible for the Department to inspect every district boundary line. The only obvious
alternative was to draft rules flatly prohibiting commercial or
industrial uses on certain classes of lakes and streams. The
DNR's planners rejected this alternative because they lacked
sufficient information about industrial needs for water to estab120
As a result, they
lish defensible shoreland zoning districts.
routinely approved county zoning maps regardless of their con21
tents.'
In these ways, the "ideal lakeshore development" picture
was transformed by political and administrative forces. Without
violating the DNR's standards, a farm or a factory might appear
on the shoreline; and lawns could replace the trees surrounding
the houses. The rest of the story-about setbacks, lot sizes, and
cluster development-is more complex.
C.

THE SETBACK RuLEs

Knowing that pollution prevention would be the most acceptable justification for their regulations, 22 the DNR's planners
searched for evidence that would support specific controls. Most
lakeshore houses dispose of their sewage through septic tank
drainfield systems.123 The sewage contains both pathogenic
bacteria and nutrients, 24 but-if everything works perfectly119. Although the state contains 87 counties, Ramsey County has no
unincorporated shorelands; and in Rock County there are no lakes. See
DIvisIoN

OF WATERS,

SOILS AND MINERALS, MINNESOTA DEP'T OF NATURAL

RESOURCES, CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR PUBLIC WATERS
[hereinafter cited as CLASSIFICATION SCHEME].

21-22 (1972)

120. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra.
121. The counties voluntarily zoned most shorelands "residential."
Id.
122. Menter Interview (Apr. 8, 1975), see note 83 supra.

123. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ELEMENTS AND ExPLANATIONS OF THE SHORELAND RULES AND REGULATIONS 20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DNR, ELEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS].
124. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MANUAL OF

Pub. No. 526, 1967). One
sanitary engineer has concluded that the average septic tank effluent
from a family of five contains concentrations of 10 mg/liter of organic
nitrogen, 25 mg/liter of nitrate ammonia, and 20 mg/liter of phosphates.
SEPTc-TANK PRACTICE 1 (Public Health Service

Annually, such a family would produce 15 pounds of phosphorus

and 27 pounds of nitrogen in human wastes. Polta, Septic Tank
Effluents in WATER POLLUTION BY NUTRIENTS--SOURCES, EFFECTS AND

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 769

these pollutants are removed as the effluent percolates through
1 25
the soil.
In practice, septic tank systems often function poorly because many sites are too marshy, sandy, or rocky for proper
filtration. 126 Even if the soil is ideal, it may eventually become
saturated and cease to cleanse the effluent.127 In addition, the
128
systems are sometimes improperly constructed or maintained.
The alternatives to septic tanks also have serious drawbacks. 129 Therefore, the DNR decided to regulate, rather than
prohibit, these systems. For a start, they copied some technical
rules about construction from the recommendations in standard
manuals. They also prohibited drainfields in such unsuitable
areas as marshy shorelands.13 0 Finally, they determined the
minimum setback between the drainfield and the water.
The planners soon realized that once they had calculated a
defensible drainfield setback, they could deduce a defensible
building setback because (so they thought)13 1 the drainfield is
usually located between the house and the lake. 3 2 Coping
with the same problem, Wisconsin's DNR had adopted the United
States Public Health Service's recommendation: 13 3 a minimum
drainfield setback of 50 feet, from which Wisconsin's planners
deduced a building setback of 75 feet, with a lot area of about
53-57 (Water Resources Research Center, University of Minnesota, Bull. No. 13, 1969).
125. MANUAL OF SEPTIC-TANK PRACTICE, supra note 124, at 29.
126. LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 25-26.
CONTROL

127.

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, SOIL

CONSERVATION

SERVICE, BULL. No. 243, SOILS SUITABLE FOR SEPTIC TANK FILTER FIELaS

2-3 (1961).
128. See generally P. MCGAUHEY & J.

WINNENBERGER, SUMMARY REPORT ON CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF FAILURE OF SEPTIC TANK PERCOLATION SYSTEMS (University of California, Berkeley, Sanitary Engineering

Research Laboratory Report No. 63-5, 1963).
129. See Kusler, supra note 85, at 72-74.
130. MnN. REG. CONS 72(b) (5) (1970).
131. See text accompanying note 273 infra.
132. Menter Interview (Nov. 17, 1970), see note 83 supra. The first
few drafts of the statewide standards (on file with the author) reveal
great uncertainty about these dimensional rules. Draft number one had
a uniform statewide drainfield setback of only 25 feet, with a minimum
lot area of only 20,000 square feet. In the second draft the drainfield
setback was increased to 50 feet. ,By the fourth draft, the building setback had become 100 feet, accompanied by a colossal drainfield setback
of 500 feet. In the next draft (and thereafter) the planners finally
decided that the drainfield would be between the house and the lake
and adopted the variable rules described in this Article.
133. See MANUAL OF SEPTIC-TANK PRACTIC=E supra note 124, at 10.
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one half acre. 13 4 Minnesota's DNR decided that the Wisconsin
rules were ideal for heavily developed lakes, where stricter standards would be unreasonable. 13 5 Many Minnesota lakes, however, are only sparsely developed. The planners also knew that
the Public Health Service's setback was designed to prevent
pathogens from reaching the water, not to prevent obnoxious
growths of nuisance algae. 1 36 For the latter purpose, larger
setbacks might be necessary because the nutrients in septic tank
effluent may travel farther through the ground than the pathogens. And so the planners studied a complex phenomenon
called eutrophication-the enrichment of lakes by nutrients.
These nutrients-chiefly phosphorus and nitgrogen-fertilize lakes, stimulating the growth of algae and other aquatic
plants. 1 37 Lake Erie is a classic example of an eutrophic lake,
while-at the other end of a continuum-Lake Superior exemplifies an oligotrophic (nutrient poor) lake. s Waters in southern, western, and central Minnesota, where the soils are rich in
nutrients, are naturally more eutrophic than those in the northeast, where the soil is infertile. 39 But civilization tends to make
all lakes more eutrophic. This process, known as cultural eutrophication, has many causes: notably, municipal sewage effluents, agricultural erosion, manure and fertilizers, some industrial discharges, and perhaps even lawn fertilizers. 40 Moreover,
by destroying the shoreland marshes and vegetation that absorb
some of the nutrients in run-off, replacing them with lawns,
-pavements, and storm sewers, we have increased the natural
4
tendency of precipitation to wash nutrients into our waters.' '
Although publicists often wrongly describe eutrophic lakes
as "dead" or "dying," scientists have learned that cultural eutrophication is reversible. 1 42 Without a continual supply of nu134. Wis. Adm. Code §§ NR 113.07(3), NR 115.03 (2) (a), (b) (1975);
see Kusler, supra note 85, at 75.
135. Menter Interview (Oct. 30, 1970), see note 83 supra.
136. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra.
137. See R. WiTZEL, LiMNOLOGY 243-45 (1975).
138. See Beeton, Changes in the Environment and Biota of the Great
Lakes, in EUTROPHICATiON, supra note 98, at 153. See also R. WETZEL,
supra note 137, at 532-36.
139. LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 3.
140. See generally EUTaOPHICAToN, supra note 98, at 3-4.
141. Interview with Dr. Joseph Shapiro, Professor and Associate Director of the Limnological Research Center, University of Minnesota, in
Minneapolis (Apr. 29, 1976).
142. See Hasler, Cultural Eutrophicationis Reversible, in 19 BiosciENCE 425 (1969).
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trients from outside the lake, the water tends toward its former,
less productive state. 143 For this reason, and because it is
generally impractical to harvest the nutrients or the algae from
the lake, abatement strategies usually involve reducing the flow
144
of incoming nutrients.
Ideally, every lake would be studied individually. As nutrients enter the water, they are consumed by the algae in certain
fixed proportions until one of them (the "limiting factor") is no
longer available. Further algal growth cannot occur until the
supply of this vital nutrient increases, regardless of the quantities
of other nutrients that may be present. 145 In a lake where
phosphorus is the limiting nutrient, a reduction of the influx of,
for instance, nitrogen will be ineffective, while in another lakewhere nitrogen is limiting-such a reduction is essential. 46 Similarly, if most of the critical nutrient enters by way of a tributary
stream, it will be futile to control some other, relatively negligible source. And finally, since one abatement technique may be
too expensive or controversial, and another (such as diversion of
municipal sewage) may create problems elsewhere, an analysis
of the lake's nutrient budget should be supplemented by analyses
of engineering and political realities.
This kind of systematic investigation, leading to a customtailored management plan, is very expensive. '4
Consequently,
only a few extraordinarily important and badly polluted lakes
have been thoroughly studied.1 48 Knowing this, the DNR's
planners sought useful generalizations. Unable to find reliable
evidence about whether septic tank effluents are relatively important sources of nutrients, 149 they proceeded on the popular
assumption that septic tanks sometimes are a significant cause
of eutrophication.
Scientists generally believe that phosphorus is the most
common limiting nutrient. 150 Most phosphatic compounds re143. Id.
144.

Shapiro Interview, supra note 141.

See also G. COLE, TExTmooK

OF LImNOLOGY 203-04 (1975); F. RuTTNER, FuNDAmENrALs OF LnVIOLOGY

99-100 (3d ed. 1963).

145. Shapiro Interview, supra note 141.
146. Id.
147. Id. Dr. Shapiro's study of five lakes in Minneapolis cost approximately $100,000.
148. Id.
149. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. See also
Kusler, supra note 85, at 68-71.
150. See R. WETzEL, supra note 137, at 243-45.
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act vigorously with soils; as a result, they usually do not travel
very far through the ground. 151 On the other hand, much
depends on the characteristics of the individual site and on
whether the drainfield system is malfunctioning. 152 Besides, in
some lakes nitrogen is the limiting factor; and nitrogenous compounds are more mobile than phosphates. 153 The planners discovered a recent study showing that nitrates can travel as far as
Since many Minnesota
140 feet through porous, sandy soils.1'
shorelands are sandy, they decided that they could justify a 150foot drainfield setback around some lakes. 55
It would have been most logical, of course, to apply this
strict setback to those lakes in which nitrogen is the limiting
nutrient. Unfortunately, because the limiting factors in most
Minnesota lakes have not been identified, 15 6 this approach was
infeasible. But Minnesota's DNR - unlike Wisconsin's -possessed a huge collection of other kinds of facts about most of the
state's major lakes and their shorelands, compiled by a team of
University geographers. This "Lakeshore Development Study"
(LDS) consisted of recently assembled data from several paro57
chial sources stored on computer tapes for quick retrieval.
For each of the lakes covered by the study, there was information about maximum depth, water surface acreage, total miles of
shoreline, numbers of seasonal and permanent homes, resorts,
dominant fish species, shoreland soils, and vegetation types.
The project's directors believed that this unique collection of

151. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ADMINISTRATION SOUTHEAST WATER LABORATORY, ROLE OF SOILS AND SEDIMINTS IN WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, PART I: REACTIONS OF NITROGENOUS
AND PHOSPHATIC COMPOUNDS WITH SOILS AND GEOLOGIC STRATA (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ROLE OF SOILS].
152. See LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 25-26.
See generally ROLE OF SOILS, supra note 151.
SCHROEPFER &R. POLTA, TRAVEL OF NITROGEN COMPOUNDS IN
SOILS (United States Public Health Service Sanitary Engineering Report
153.

154. G.

172-S, 1969).

155. Menter Interview (Apr. 8, 1975), see note 83 supra.
156. Shapiro Interview, supra note 141.
157. See BORCHERT, MINNESOTA'S LAKESHORE, PART II: SUMMARY

PORT OF THE MINNESOTA LAKESHORE DEVELOPMENT STUDY

(1970).

RE-

The

study covers most of Minnesota's major recreational lakes. Basically all

lakes with a basin acreage of more than 150 acres were included. Omitted were lakes within the seven county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, Lake Superior, all rivers, some dry or partially dry lake
basins, as well as lakes completely within government owned areas.
LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 1.
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information would be invaluable for many kinds of managerial
15 8
decisions.
Understandably enthusiastic about their study, the authors
of the LDS wanted the DNR to use the data to classify lakes,
with different rules for each classification.' 59 At first, some
DNR officials balked at the idea. 160 Their hesitation, though it
may have been motivated by ordinary bureaucratic inertia, narrow-mindedness, or hostility to ideas from outsiders, was not
wholly indefensible. The LDS statistics did not contain indices
of eutrophication (transparency, for example), 16 1 nor did they
identify each lake's limiting nutrient. Yet the data did reveal
lakeshore soil types and other potentially useful details. After
some lobbying by members of the LDS staff, and newspaper
editorials that rebuked the DNR for its recalcitrance, 162 the
Department finally decided to use the LDS data as the basis for
an ambitious classification system under which there would be
63
variable dimensional rules.
The planners invented four classifications: Natural Environment (NE), Critical (C), Recreational Development (RD),
and General Development (GD), with the following minimum
64
standards for each class: 1

158. See LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 45.
159.

Interview with George Orning, Former Associate Director,

Minnesota Lakeshore Development Study, in Minneapolis (May 7, 1976).
160. Id.
161. Abundance of algae is the most commonly accepted index. This
is related to transparency because algae absorb light, thus reducing transparency. Interview with Professor Robert Megard, Dep't of Ecology and
Behavioral Biology, University of Minnesota, in Minneapolis (May 27,
1976).
162. One participant recalls three factors that may have influenced
the eventual decision to classify: (1) internal DNR support for the idea,
including two new members of the Shorelands Unit (Menter and Hambrock) who, as students, had helped to assemble the LDS; (2) "educational efforts" by some of those who had directed the LDS; and (3)
"more than one" newspaper editorial on the subject, inspired by discussions between the journalists and LDS officials. Orning Interview, supra
note 159.
163. Many of the rules in the statewide standards are uniform for
all classifications. See, e.g., MINN. REG. CONS 74, 75 (1970) (subdivision
regulations and administrative provisions).
164. Id. 72(b) (4) (drainfield setbacks), 73(b) (1) (building setbacks), 73(a) (lot areas and widths, the latter figures applicable at
both the water line and the building line), 73(b) (3) (highway and
road setbacks). See also id. 71(a) (2) (dd) (NE rules also apply to
Critical lakes), 73(a) (3) (development on substandard lots of record),
73(a) (4) (bb) (smaller lot sizes may be permitted, with the DNR's
approval, for cluster developments or areas served by a public sewer).
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Classification
NE
C
RD
GD

Drainfield
Setback
150'
150'
75'
50'

Building Lot
Setback Width
200'
200'
200'
200'
100'
150'
75'
100'

Road165
Setback
30' or 50'
30' or 50'
30' or 50'
30' or 50'

Lot

Area
(sq. ft.)
80,000
80,000
40,000
20,000

The rules for GD lakes are similar to Wisconsin's uniform statewide standards. 166 The drainfield setback for NE
167
and C lakes was derived from the study of nitrogen migration;
the setback for RD lakes is an arbitrary intermediate figure.' 68
The building setbacks were, as previously noted, the result
of adding several feet to the drainfield setbacks on the theory
that the drainfield will be between the house and the lake.
Curiously, the building setbacks for GD and RD lakes are only
25 feet greater than the drainfield setbacks on these lakes, while
on NE and C lakes the building setback is 50 feet greater than
the drainfield setback. This discrepancy was not based-even
tenuously-on any particular scientific evidence. 6 9 Apparently,
the 200-foot setback, unlike the others, was designed less to regulate development than to deter it around those lakes that the
70
DNR decided were better suited for wildlife than for homes.
Certainly with different motives, and probably with better justifications, the planners were using one of the much criticized
71
techniques of ordinary "exclusionary zoning.'
The minimum width and lot area figures also were not derived from specific scientific evidence (there was none), except
to the extent that deep (and therefore large) lots were entailed
165. "No structure shall be placed nearer than 50 feet from the rightof-way line of any federal, state, or county trunk highway; or 30 feet
from the right-of-way line of any town road, public street, or others not
classified." Id. 73 (b) (3").
166. Compare MINN. REG. CONS 72(b) (4) (c), 73(a) (1) (cc) (1970)
with WIs. ADM. CODE § NR 115.03 (1971).
167. DNR, ELEumNTS AND EXPLANATiONS, supra note 123, at 10. The
study was by G. SCHROEPFER & R. POLTA, supra note 154.
168. Menter Interview (Nov. 17, 1970), see note 83 supra.
169. Menter Interview (Feb. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra.
170. See note 188 infra.
171. See, e.g., Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1965) ("To the extent that we could
not prevent growth altogether, we have tried to make that growth as
expensive as possible to both the builder and the homeowner so that
houses would be costly, yield higher school taxes, and prevent undesirable elements from settling in the community.").
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by the drainfield setbacks. 1 7 2 In addition to reducing pollution,
the DNR wished to prevent overcrowding of lake surfaces. 1 73
Since the rules concerning the size and shape of lots tend to restrict the number of persons living near lakes, they serve both
purposes. The planners knew that surface overcrowding is difficult to predict because it may be affected more by such factors
as whether a lake is close to a city, whether it has a public access,
and whether it has good fishing, than by how many families
live around the lake. 1 74 They knew that it would sometimes
be feasible-and perhaps preferable-to regulate surface overcrowding directly by water surface zoning. 1 75 They also knew
that one effect of the lot size restrictions might be to increase the
price of lakeshore lots; 1 76 if so, the cost of the environmental

172. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. Even
with a house 40 feet deep, and a road setback of 50 feet, the lot area
entailed by the 200-foot building setback, coupled with the lot width of
200 feet, on NE lakes is only 58,000 square feet, or 22,000 square feet less
than required by the statewide standards. The DNR simply added the
additional square footage. Id.
173.
174.
175.

DNR, ELEmENTS AND EXPLANATIONS, supra note 123, at 18, 21.
Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra.
Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. See MINrN.
STAT. § 361.26(2) (1976):
(a) Upon request of a county, city or town, the commissioner
may, if he determines it to be in the public interest, establish
regulations relating to the use of watercraft on waters of this
state which border upon or are within, in whole or in part, the
territorial boundaries of the governmental unit ....
(c) Such
regulations may restrict any or all of the following: (1) the
type and size of watercraft and size of motor which may use
the waters affected by the regulation, (2) the areas of water
which may be used by watercraft, (3) speed of watercraft, (4)
times permitted for use of watercraft, or (5) minimum distance
between watercraft. When establishing regulations the commissioner shall consider the physical characteristics of the
waters affected, their historical uses, shoreland uses and classification, and any other features unique to the waters affected by
the regulations.
176. The most frequent criticism of the regulations at the formal
public hearing in St. Paul was that the minimum lot area and frontage
requirements would increase the price of lakeshore homes. See Transcript, supra note 106, at 86, 118-19, 121, 136. See also letter from Professor Robert W. Snyder to Eugene Gere (Apr. 21, 1970) (on file with
the author):
[H]alf-acre 100 foot frontage lot minimums make lot frontage
too expensive for some families to afford. The effect is compounded by more stringent regulations on "recreational development" and "natural environment" lakes ... . This has two
types of ramifications: (1) It essentially makes the private use
and enjoyment of lakeshore property unavailable to a certain
number of families with limited economic means, thus reducing
the social advantage of the presence of this valuable resource,
a social advantage of particular economic importance to a state
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benefits ultimately would be paid largely by consumers. For
various reasons-whose relative influence is incalculable-they
were not moved by this consideration. The statutory purpose,
which coincided with the Department's own proclivities, was
preservation of lakeshore environments, not provision of housing;
the planners knew that while inexpensive housing is essential,
inexpensive lakeshore housing is not; and they hoped that large
lot sizes would encourage cluster developments where, in return
for relaxation of the density controls, developers would agree to
1 77
preserve open space around the development. "
Politically, the crucial fact was that the setbacks and other
dimensional rules applied (here as in nearly all zoning) prospectively to undeveloped land, not retroactively to landowners who
had already built lakeshore cottages.1 8 The future purchasers of
lots were, of course, unconscious of their interests, unaware of
the proposed dimensional rules, and absent from the public hearings. 79 Most of the owners of large tracts of unplatted shoresuch as Minnesota ....
(2) Since a certain number of families
are eliminated from the market for seasonal homes, the total
number of seasonal homes in rural areas will probably be reduced (unless the absence of smaller lots makes larger lots more
attractive to those who can afford them). Thus the very significant economic impact of seasonal homes will be proportionately
less.

See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 63, at 5-7 (1973).

177. DNR, ELEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS, supra note 123, at 37. In
conversations with the author, the drafters repeatedly defended their NE
dimensional rules by saying that they hoped these rules would encourage
duster developments. The major lobbyist for the shorelands bill was a
cluster developer, located in Bloomington. Orning Interview, note 159
supra.
178. One exception should be noted. The DNR's rules require replacement of substandard septic tank drainfield systems within five
years. MINN. REG. CONS 75 (c) (1970).

179. Perusal of the transcript of the hearings reveals that almost all
of the questions and criticisms by ordinary landowners had to do with
the effect of the regulations on their already-developed lots. Only one
citizen identified himself as a farmer. The critics of the dimensional
rules were "primarily developers." Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see
note 83 supra. In addition, the DNR received many inquiries from owners of substandard lots of record who were mollified when informed that
their lots were exempt from the rules. Id. In some areas, rapid development has created conflicts between farmers and commuters, who complain about farm noises and odors, and demand increased municipal
services. Citing such problems, one official from a county on the
southern fringe of the Twin Cities metropolitan area says that even a
five acre minimum lot size is too small. Interview with William Gill,
Rice County Zoning Administrator, in Minneapolis (May 5, 1975).
Where such sentiments prevail, even the two acre lot size for NE lakes
must seem minimal.
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land-farmers, for instance-had no reason to complain because
they had no plans to sell to developers, while many of those who
already owned lakeshore houses were naturally inclined to believe that further development should be regulated. As a result,
the dimensional rules could be strict without arousing widespread
resistance.
It may also be significant that although the proposed standards contained several inexact classification criteria-for example, "county and regional public water needs"--they did not
enable a reader to ascertain precisely how the DNR would
classify any particular lake. It was only after the public hearings and the adoption of the statewide standards that the DNR
began to fashion a web of detailed formulas that determined
how the lakes would be classified, and thus whose property
would be regulated most strictly. 180
D.

CLASSIFYING

Since the planners had to classify approximately 9,700 lake
basins (and about 25,000 miles of rivers and streams),"" they
plainly could not wait until every watershed had been carefully
studied. The classification criteria had to facilitate rapid, almost automatic, classification of most waters, leaving the classifiers free to devote their time to a relatively small number of
borderline cases. And yet the DNR also wanted to be able to
defend every classification decision by reference to a logical
82
system buttressed by indubitable facts.'

180. There is no reason to suppose that this delay was due to invidious motives. The Department was extraordinarily busy, and in any
case the classification formulas were difficult to devise until-having finished the statewide standards-the planners were free to devote most
of their time to the complicated problem of classifying.
181. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF NATURAL REsouRcES, CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
FOR PUBLIC WATERS: SHORELAND MANAGEMENT 10 (1971)
[hereinafter
cited as DNR, CLASSIFICATION].

The statute applied to

all "public

waters." AIum. STAT. § 105.485 (1976). This imprecise term has a long
history of murky legal definitions. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 109
supra. To avoid the impossible task of deciding in each case whether
a small brook or pond was "public," the DNR decided that
[t] his shall be construed to mean, for the purposes of these regulations, any body of water which has the potential to support
any type of recreational pursuit or water supply purpose. How-

ever, no lake, pond or flowage of less than 25 acres in size and

no river or stream having a total drainage area less than two
square miles need be regulated by the county for the purposes
of these regulations.
MiNe. REG. CONS 70(d) (1970).

182. Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. They wished,
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For both of these reasons, the Lakeshore Development
Study's computer "data bank" had an immense influence, not
only in the debate about whether to adopt a classification system, but also in determining the nature of that system. It
was the only convenient source of reams of facts about most of
the state's major lakes. Because the purpose of the LDS, which
had a limited budget, was to assemble data and not to undertake
new studies, the LDS tape was not a perfect set of management
information. The project's director had decided that the most
important thing was to get started. When some new collection of
useful statistics appeared, it could easily be added to the
nucleus of information.

18 3

As a result of this sensible decision, the tail of available
data wagged the dog of management policy. For example,
rivers-no matter how beautiful-were ordinarily classified
General Development because the LDS had not inventoried
them, and consequently the classifiers felt unable to make defensible distinctions among them.8 4 The LDS had also omitted
lakes of under 150 surface acres; 8 5 these, by contrast, were
generally classified NE on the theory that-unlike running
waters or large lakes-small ponds cannot withstand much nutrient pollution. 8 6 Thus, paradoxically, the imperative of desaid the chief classifier, "to make it so it'd be as nonintuitive as possible."
Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
183. See LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 45.
184. Hambrock Interview (July 15, 1970), see note 83 supra. The
main reasons for classifying rivers GD were (1) lack of data about
existing development along rivers and (2) the fact that septic tank
pollution is generally less likely to damage moving rivers than lakes.
Recognizing that nutrients entering via a tributary stream may exacerbate lake pollution, the DNR considered assigning each lake's classification to all its tributary rivers, but dropped the idea because of such
complexities as how to classify the intricate webs of tributaries of the
tributaries. Id. To the general policy of classifying streams GD, they
made two exceptions: officially-designated trout streams and components of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. "These exceptions
are not unreasonable, since these streams have been recognized by governmental agencies as waters worthy of preservation and since easements
along these streams are usually purchased." DNR, CLAssIFcAmoN, supra
note 181, at 10.
185. See note 157 supra.
186. Every lake basin between 25-150 acres was classified as
Natural Environment unless development was detected. The
detailed amount of data available for large lakes was not available for smaller lakes. By nature of their size, these lakes are
highly susceptible to overcrowding. Therefore, the decision was
made to initially classify them in a restrictive category. When
development already existed on these lakes (information ob-
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fensibility led to the indefensible result that houses may be built
closer to scenic canoeing rivers than to swampy ponds.
The underlying problem was that building setbacks serve
aesthetic purposes, while drainfield setbacks are for pollution
control. Under the statewide standards, these two regulations
were linked: to impose the 200-foot NE building setback, the
DNR also had to impose (and be prepared to defend) the 150foot NE drainfield setback. Lacking authoritative indices of
shoreland beauty, and knowing that most people (including
judges) worry more about pollution than about aesthetics, the
planners scrupulously avoided aesthetic judgments, even to the
point of ignoring some of the law that they had just created. In
the statewide standards, published before the classifiers had
pondered concrete classification decisions, the "management goals
and objectives" for NE lakes and streams were "to preserve
and enhance high quality waters by protecting them from pollution and to protect shorelands of waters which are unsuitable for
development .... ,,187 By "high quality waters" they meant
extraordinarily beautiful lakes. 8 8 By "waters unsuitable for
development," they meant lakes that are unusually vulnerable
tained from county highway maps), they were classified as
Recreational Development.

DNR, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 10-11.

Although "overcrowding"

does not seem to connote pollution, the drafters stressed-in conversations with the author-the idea that, all else being equal, small lakes
are more vulnerable to septic tank pollution. "Larger lakes will not
deteriorate as rapidly as small ones when developed, due to a larger
volume of water [to absorb incoming nutrients?] and a greater likelihood of some portion of the lake remaining undeveloped." Id. at 5.
The latter assumption is questionable.
187. MINN. REG.CONS 71(a) (2) (aa) (1970).
188. At the public hearing on the proposed statewide standards,
James Menter explained the NE classification:
The Natural Environment lake is the one that possesses primarily scenic natural beauty. An area that should be preserved
to keep these areas in a natural state, these lakes will set Minnesota aside as a unique recreational and tourist area. These lakes
would be those that are largely undeveloped. Therefore the
management policies established for these lakes will be preventative in nature, thus preserving these areas in a natural
state. They will not conflict with existing development on these
bodies of water.
A second type of lake which is to be included in the Natural
Environment category is the large shallow duck marsh or
swamp. These are areas that should not be developed due to
their unsuitability for development. A soil absorption unit will
not function in these wet soils. Wet soils also provide poor
building foundations. These lakes cannot be used for recreational purposes. They are inadequate for fishing due to the difficulty of maintaining permanent fish life. Generally, these are
duck lakes, and should be managed as such.
Transcript, supra note 106, at 19.
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to septic tank pollution or surface overcrowding. 18 9

In other

words, they wished to apply the strictest (NE) regulations to the
two extremes among Minnesota's lakes: some of the most
beautiful, rocky, forested, oligotrophic northern lakes, plus the
shallow, weedy, eutrophic lakes, located mostly in the fertile
southern and western regions of the state.
Considered abstractly, both ideas are plausible. Around
the finest lakes, one may want strict land use controls so that the
shorelands will remain attractive and the water will remain pure.
Around "duckponds" (as the DNR's planners nicknamed the
shallow, marshy lakes), one may want strict controls to arrest
further deterioration. Although these ideas were equally logical, they were not equally workable. The LDS statisticssupplemented by maps from the DNR's files---could reveal the
shallow, marshy lakes with tolerable accuracy. But how does
one quickly compile a definitive list of the most beautiful waters
in a state that contains about 10,000 lakes and 25,000 miles of
rivers and streams? If nothing important would result from the
designations, one could easily draw up a list of the "20 most
beautiful lakes" as casually (and inaccurately) as a magazine
might name the "20 best dressed women." But the magazine's editors need not answer for their harmless frivolity. Under
the Shoreland Management Act, the classifications would not be
harmless and should not be made casually. It would hardly do
to tell affected landowners (and the local courts): "The building setback on Long Lake is 200 feet because a game warden
told me that it's a pretty lake." There is no "scenic inventory"
of Minnesota's lakes that might at least look authoritative. Apprehensive that the use of scenery as a criterion would inevitably
lead to patently indefensible distinctions, the planners discarded the idea of affording special protection to "high quality"
waters.190
The classification criteria that survived were starkly objective ones that could be applied speedily and consistently by
programming a computer to reproduce statistics compiled by the
LDS.191 To obtain consistent decisions, the planners invented
classification formulas. Inevitably, the formulas themselves
were essentially arbitrary. But they looked impersonal, ensured
189. Id.; see also DNR, CLAssIcATioN, supra note 181, at 11-12.
190. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
191. Waters not included in the LDS study were classified more
laboriously with the aid of rules-of-thumb. See text accompanying
notes 200-01 infra.
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a high degree of internal consistency, and enabled the DNR to
meet its deadline by mass-producing classifications.
If the computer print-out revealed that a lake was fifteen
feet deep (or shallower), had no game fish, and had a development density of less than three dwellings per mile of shoreline,it
was (at least tentatively) classified Natural Environment on the
ground that it was unsuitable for development.192 Depth was a
classification factor because, for a given surface acreage, a shallow lake will of course contain less water in which to disperse
incoming nutrients. ("Fifteen feet or below" was the shallowest
category in the LDS statistics.) "No game fish"-another datum from the LDS-was interpreted as corroborative evidence
that the lake was exceptionally shallow and weedy-better, they
193
thought, for wildlife than for houses.
Knowing that the courts sometimes strike down zoning
rules that are not reasonably consistent with preexisting patterns
of development, the planners reserved the NE classification for
those lakes that were sparsely settled. 94 The development
192. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
193. See note 188 supra. The LDS data identified the dominant fish
species in each lake. The most likely explanation for the absence of
game fish was thought to be insufficiently dissolved oxygen, a phenomenon that is generally most acute in shallow, weedy lakes. Hambrock
Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83, supra. With a touch of paternalism, the DNR also concluded that shallow lakes are less suitable for
development from the consumer's point of view. Menter Interview
(Nov. 10, 1970), see note 83 supra.
194. DNR, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 5. The setbacks and

lot sizes required by the statewide standards-especially those for NE
lakes-were known to be substantially larger than many existing lakeshore setbacks and lot sizes. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note
83 supra.
Most of the lake-home areas in Minnesota with small lots (100
feet or less in width) were developed in the 1920's-the early
days of the automobile era. In contrast, most post-World War
II cabins are built on lots with more than 100 feet of frontage.
However, some current lakeshore developments contain very
small lots, with widths as low as 60 feet.

LDS, PART I, supra note 108, at 22-23. See also Zampieri v. Township
of River Vale, 29 N.J. 599, 152 A.2d 28 (1959)

(building setback rule held

invalid whre 15 of 35 existing structures did not conform to
requirement).
Another reason for imposing the stricter controls on the less
developed lakes was that strict rules would be more effective
tively undeveloped areas. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976),

the new
heavilyin relasee note

83 supra. With the exception of nonconforming septic tank systems, the

dimensional controls did not apply to existing development. See MINN.
REa. CONS 75(c) (1970) (substandard septic tank systems must be replaced within five years). Consequently, it seemed futile (and unfair)
to classify a heavily developed lake NE merely to regulate land use on

the remaining vacant tracts. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note
83 supra.

1977]

VARIANCES

density cutoff point of three dwellings per mile of shoreline was
derived from a "natural break" in a frequency distribution graph
produced by the computer. The classifiers selected two breaks
in the graph's line to serve as a maximum figure for Natural
Environment lakes and a minimum figure for General Development lakes. Their criteria for choosing among the breaks on the
graph were subjective. Although some lakes had to be placed
in each classification, they wanted the highest percentage to be
Natural Environment. This preference determined their choice
among the possible cutoff points. While realizing that this was
an arbitrary way to decide, they could conceive of no preferable
(or even less arbitrary) technique. 195
The classifiers then proceeded to make similar notations for
"automatic" Recreational Development lakes. If a lake had a
development density between 3 and 25, a crowding potential
between 60 and 225 and a maximum depth over 15 feet, it was
(at least tentatively) classified Recreational Development. 96
The crowding potential is the lake's water surface acreage
divided by its miles of shoreline. 97 This figure tends to indicate how crowded the lake's surface will be after the
shoreline is developed. All else being equal, a lake with
an irregular shoreline will-when fully developed-have more
riparian cottages per surface acre than a rounder lake. On
such lakes, the DNR concluded, there is a greater statistical
likelihood of conflicts between, say, waterskiers and fishermen, 198 although on any particular lake some other factor (such
as whether the fishing is good) may be much more influential
than the crowding potential. Lacking more sophisticated indices, the classifiers used the crowding potentials as evidence of
the need for large lot sizes, and therefore the stricter classifications, to control the density of shoreland development.
Finally, the classifiers noted probable General Development
lakes. If a lake's maximum depth was over 15 feet, with a
development density over 25 and a crowding potential over 225,
it was (at least tentatively) classified General Development. 99
To supplement these formulas, especially in cases where a
lake did not meet any of the three sets of criteria for "automatic"
classification, the DNR took account of several other kinds of
information that sometimes persuaded them to change even an
195. Menter Interview (Nov. 3, 1970), see note 83 supra.
196. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
197. DNI, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 5.
198. Id.
199. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
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automatic classification produced by the formulas. For example, they refined the concept of "development density" by examining maps; nearby cities and highways were treated as evidence
in favor of a lenient classification. 20 0 They often scrutinized
LDS data about the soil, vegetation, and topography of a lake's
shore, trying to decide whether septic tanks would function
poorly in the area, for instance, because it was marshy. 20 1 Lakes
partially within a government controlled wildlife area, such as a
state game refuge, were generally classified NE, both to further
the purposes of the area and because many of them were
probably "duck marshes," corresponding to the DNR's image of
20 2
a typical Natural Environment lake.

There was one loose end in the classification system. The state'20 3
wide standards described a fourth classification: "Critical.
According to the standards, Critical lakes were to be gov200.

DNR, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 6, 10.

The planners rea-

soned that, since the Shorelands Act did not apply to incorporated areas,
stringent regulations would be less effective on lakes abutted by cities
than on those whose shorelands were entirely unincorporated. Id. at 10.
Accordingly, these lakes were usually classified GD. Id. But if the lake
was under 150 acres and had the "poor physical characteristics" typical
of NE lakes, it was usually classified RD as a compromise reflecting
the countervailing factors. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 9, 1970), see note
83 supra. The Act was later amended to cover municipalities. See MmN.
STAT. § 105.485(6) (1976). It remains true, however, that nearby cities
presumably tend to create a demand for shoreland, and roads provide
access, considerations that can plausibly be said to justify classifications
based on these factors. See DNR, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 6,
10.
The maximum depth figure from the LDS was also supplemented
by examining data about median lake depths. See Id. at 7.
201. The following chart, used by the DNR, shows how such information was interpreted.
DOMINANT
CLASSIFICATION
SOIL GROUP
VEGETATION
SLOPES
NE
Wet, clay or
No trees
Flat
bedrock
or shrubs
RD or GD

Sand, loam

Deciduous or
Moderate
coniferous
to steep
trees
DNR, CLASSIFICATION, supra note 181, at 9. Shallow, marshy "duckponds" tend to have flat, wet shorelands without many trees. "Clay"
and "bedrock" are also poor soils for septic tank drainage. See LDS,
PAR I, supra note 108, at 26. So is sand; but, on the other hand, (from
the consumer's standpoint) sandy beaches are ideal for development. Id.
T
at 25.
202. Interview with Ron Harnack, DivisioA of Waters, Soils and
Minerals, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of FIinnesota, in St. Paul
(Feb. 1, 1971).
203. MIN. REG. CONS 71(a) (2) (dd) (1970).
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erned by the same rules as Natural Environment lakes. But
they were to be selected by different criteria. Rather than being
"unsuitable for development," they were to be already "badly
deteriorated." These lakes, said the standards, "shall be studied
in further detail to determine appropriate standards for shoreland development for each individual lake. ' 20 4 Again, the abstract idea seemed rational; and its inclusion in the statewide
standards was another manifestation of the DNR's tendency-at
that stage-to embrace all the plausible classification theories.
The Natural Environment classification rested on a prophecy;
we predict that this lake will deteriorate badly if its shorelands become densely developed. Now what about lakes that
are already badly deteriorated? Aren't these the ones where
corrective measures are most urgently needed? If they were
sparsely developed and if they met the criteria that defined
"unsuitable for development," then they probably would be
classified Natural Environment. Otherwise, they might be classified at the other extreme (General Development) because
they were deep, or large, or had densely developed shorelands.
A GD classification, however, would mean that the lakes that
were already badly polluted would receive the least protection
under the new program. On the other hand, if such a lake were
heavily developed, the new land use controls, operating prospectively, probably would not do much good. What was really needed was an intensive study of the individual problems of these
lakes, leading to unique management plans. In some cases, the
plan might involve land use controls; in others, the remedy
might be outside the DNR's jurisdiction-for example, improved municipal sewage treatment. In the meantime, as a
signal to the citizenry, and to do whatever good could be done
20 5
by zoning, the DNR decided to classify these lakes Critical.
The first problem with this classification was that the DNR
could not find a reliable way to identify "badly deteriorated"
lakes. From time to time the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency had made ad hoc studies of particular lakes, some of
which were severely polluted.20 6 But many of the worst ones
had not been studied adequately. 07 The DNR therefore tried to
204. Id.
205. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
206. The author has examined several such studies.
207. Shapiro Interview, supra note 141. Dr. Shapiro cited Lakes
Shagawa (St. Louis County), Sallie (Becker County), and Big Stone
(Big Stone County) as examples of important, eutrophic lakes that had
not been thoroughly studied at the time the DNR had to make its
decisions.
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devise a system for identifying Critical lakes by using the LDS
data. Because the purity of most lakes and streams had never
been measured scientifically, the LDS had not collected statistics
about water quality. Nevertheless, it seemed reasonable to assume that a lake with Natural Environment physical characteristics ("unsuitable for development"), combined with General Development developmental characteristics (relatively heavily
developed) would be badly deteriorated-that, after all, was the
prophecy underlying the Natural Environment classification criwas to classify
teria. Accordingly, the DNR's original plan
20 8
lakes meeting both these standards as Critical.

During the classification process, the planners began to
have second thoughts about Critical lakes. As defined in the
statewide standards, this was to be a temporary classification,
pending the completion of master plans based upon intensive
studies. That sounded perfect, until they began to ponder the
implications. Studies by whom? Are we-with no assurance
of adequate money and st/if-going to assume an obligation to
devise comprehensive plans for hundreds of lakes? Leery of
this administrative monster, the DNR backed away.2 0 9 Lakes
that fell within the formula for this classification were treated as
only potentially Critical. The final, official designation as Critical was made rarely, reluctantly, and very subjectively.2 10 The
result often turned on the classifier's visual impression of the
lake during a field trip undertaken for this purpose. 211 Only
nine lakes were so classified. 2 12 Although nearly all Critical
lakes appear to be badly eutrophic, 213 many apparently equally
eutrophic lakes were classified General Development. 214 More208. Hambrock Interview (Oct. 7, 1970), see note 83 supra.
209. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra. Hambrock volunteers that the "concept was maybe not thought out as well
as it should have been. Our idea was to throw it in and see what happens." Id. Even during the classification process, the planners began
to wonder whether land use controls could achieve anything around such
lakes. Menter Interview (Aug. 3, 1970), see note 83 supra.
210. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra.
211. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra. Unlike
most other lakes, every "Critical" lake was inspected before being classified. Id. One of them was so odoriferous that a visiting planner had
difficulty breathing. Hambrock Interview (July 14, 1970), see note 83
supra.
212. DNR, CLAsswICATION, supra note 181, at 22.
213. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra.
214. For example, all three of the lakes listed by Dr. Shapiro, supra
note 207, were classified General Development. The classification lists
for individual counties are on file at the DNR; copies are on file with
the author.
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over, the DNR has no evidence that the pollution of any of these
lakes can be curbed by controlling septic tank drainage.21 5 The
Critical classification, as the planners now seem to realize, 216
was a mistake.
III.

THE EFFECTS OF VARIANCES: A CASE STUDY

Now that all of the counties have adopted shoreland zoning
ordinances, 217 they have exchanged roles with the state: the
DNR counsels; the counties decide. The Department did not
reserve a general veto power over variances or other local administrative decisions.2 1
For one thing, it was unclear whether the
language of the Shorelands Act, which basically contemplated
local administration, could be stretched that far.21 9 The DNR
was also inhibited by political and administrative fears. Local
governments tend to accept general state standards more readily
215. Hambrock Interview (Nov. 10, 1970), see note 83 supra. See
also text accompanying notes 140-41, 149 supra.
216. See note 209 suipra and accompanying text. The DNR has since
reclassified some of the Critical lakes and is considering further reclassifications. Interview with David Milles, Senior Hydrologist, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of Minnesota, in St. Paul (June 9, 1976).
217. Although only about half of the counties met the statutory
deadline (July 1, 1972), the rest enacted satisfactory ordinances by
September 1, 1973. MINESOTA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MINNESOTA'S SHORELAND MANAGEMENT

LOSOPHY-STATUS 4, 8

PROGRAM:

SCOPEF-ADMINISTRATIVE

PHI-

(1974).

218. The statewide standards reflect compromises on this point
that look more assertive in print than they have proved to be in practice. Thus, the DNR must be notified of forthcoming variance hearings,
and it must be promptly furnished with copies of all variance decisions.
MINN. REG. CONS 75(a) (1970). Compliance with this requirement has
been spotty. Some counties did not incorporate this language in their
ordinances, which were nevertheless approved by the DNR. In addition
many variances have been granted informally by zoning administrators,
who usually do not solicit the DNR's advice. The notices of formal hearings sometimes are not sent, or arrive too late. And the copies of decisions-if and when they arrive-usually do not contain enough precise
information to enable anyone to appraise the result. Interview with
Bruce Gerbig, Shorelands Unit, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of
Minnesota, in St. Paul (Apr. 23, 1976).
The DNR also adopted an ambiguous requirement that "[a]ll plats
which are inconsistent with the county shoreland ordinance shall be reviewed by the . . . [DNR] before final county approval may be granted."
MINN. REG. CONS 74(b) (1970). The DNR has not interpreted "reviewed" to mean "approved"-at most, it advises a county that the plat
should not be approved. Frequently, the county does not even send a
copy of the plat. Gerbig Interview, supra.
219. The relevant statutory language is quoted in text accompanying
note 88 supra. It is obviously ambiguous about the possibility of state

vetoes.
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than direct state intervention in specific cases. 220 The drafters
staff could not evaluate
also knew that their small shorelands
21
2
thousands of variances every year.

The statewide standards do, however, provide that any
cluster development proposal that involves a relaxation of the
DNR's lot size or other density controls must be approved by
the Department. 222 Hoping that their large lot sizes would make
clusters more profitable than ordinary subdivisions, 223 the planners were prepared to appraise each plan for a cluster development to make certain that its environmental features justified
whatever density concessions the developer requested. Unfortunately, the anticipated trend toward cluster development still
has not occurred. Despite the large lot sizes imposed by the
state, only a few developers have asked the DNR for permission
to build clusters.2 24 Most of those that the DNR has approved
were later rejected by the county governments, as was their right
under the statewide standards. 225 Evidently the DNR misjudged
the demand for cluster housing and the practical difficulties that
a cluster developer often encounters, including fierce resistance
from nearby residents.

226

Judged by reference to the planners' original aspirations,
the absence of cluster developments may be the major failure of
shoreland zoning. But to ordinary citizens this kind of failure is
220. Explaining the absence of a veto power, one official said "we
didn't want to create a 'flap.'" Hollenstein Interview (Nov. 14, 1970),
see note 83 supra. Another recalls that "we didn't feel that we had a
sufficient legislative mandate [to reserve a veto power], especially considering the sensitivity of the program in its initial stages." Hambrock
Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra. He adds: "If you give
them [the counties] some standards, and let them make the decisions
[concerning variances], that's generally fairly palatable," as contrasted
with requiring that particular local decisions be submitted to the state
for approval.
221. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra.
222. IwNq. REG. CONS 74 (d) (1970).
223. See note 177 supra.
224. One former official recalls about two or three serious proposals
for cluster developments, plus a few informal inquiries. Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra. This may be partly because
so far most new construction has been on GD and RD lakes, where the
dimensional rules are much less strict than on NE lakes. See Table II, at
p. 828 infra.
225. Bruce Gerbig, of the DNR's Shorelands Unit, does not recall any
shoreland cluster developments that have been approved by both the
DNR and the local government. There have been several "quite good
ones" that the DNR has approved "and then they've been chopped down
on the local level, even though from our standpoint it has less impact
than most development." Gerbig Interview, supra note 218.
226. See generally Lloyd, supra note 171.
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exceedingly inconspicuous, and it has not been publicized.
Building setback variances, on the other hand, are relatively
visible; and for them there is someone to blame. It is not
surprising, therefore, that metropolitan environmentalists have
publicly expressed only one criticism of shoreland zoning: that
227
it may be a "fraud" because variances are freely granted.
They mean, of course, that the substantive regulatory goals
may be nullified, not that landowners are being treated unfairly.
This apprehension, like similar speculation elsewhere, is based
upon anecdotal evidence rather than systematic collections of
data. To measure the effects of variances more precisely, we
selected two Minnesota counties: Otter Tail and Wright. These
counties are not necessarily representative, 228 but they do provide contrasts. Although both are predominantly rural and
agricultural, Otter Tail is much larger.229 It contains some 686
lakes of 25 or more surface acres, which, together with Wright's
221 lakes, comprise over nine percent of all the regulated
lakes. 230 Wright County is on the fringe of the Twin Cities
metropolitan area, while Otter Tail is in west-central Minnesota,
relatively remote from large cities. As one would expect,
Wright's shorelands are more heavily developed; but Otter Tail
has become a popular site for lakeshore homes. 23 ' Neither
county contains magnificent northwoods scenery. Yet they both
227. St. Paul Dispatch, Sept. 5, 1973, at 1, col. 1 ("Environmentalists
Rap Shoreland Act Variances").
228. Possibly the counties with the worst records are in northern
Minnesota, where residents have traditionally been hostile to state
regulations. In contrast, seminar students, using our methodology to
study building setbacks in counties near the Twin Cities, have generally
found that the incidence of variances is distinctly less than in Wright
and Otter Tail.
229. Otter Tail comprises 1,962 square miles; Wright comprises 674
square miles.

U.S.

BuREAu OF THE CENsus,

Boox-1972, at 246, 258 (1973)

COUNTY

AND CITY DATA

(a statistical abstract supplement).
According to the 1970 census, Otter Tail's population was 46,097, of
whom 15,936 were "farm population" and 17,718 were "rural non-farm
population." The farm population, however, declined by 24.8% between
1960 and 1970. Id. at 246, 256. Wright's population was 38,933 (58 per
square mile, as opposed to 23 in Otter Tail). Id. at 258, 246. Wright's
farm population was 9,784 (a decline of 28.29 between 1960 and 1970),
with a rural non-farm population of 25,874. Id. at 268. In both counties
well over half of the land area is cultivated. STATE OF MINNESOTA
DEP'T OF ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, MINNESOTA PROFILE 42 (1975).
230.

CLASSIFICATION

SCHEME,

supra note 119, at 20-21. The statewide

total is 9,667. Id. at 21.
231. See, e.g., Table II,at p. 828 infra. The LDS reported that Wright
County had 11.2 homes per mile of shoreline; Otter Tail had 6.4. LDS,
PART

I, supra note 108, at 13.
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have attractive pastoral lakes, often moderately eutrophic, but
pleasant for the usual recreational pursuits. Wright County
zoned its shorelands a few years before the Shoreland Management Act, though with much less stringent rules than those that
23 2
the state later imposed, and it now has countywide zoning.

Otter Tail, on the other hand, had no zoning before the state
intervened, and its land use controls are still confined to shorelands. 23 3 Nevertheless, the DNR's Shorelands Unit regards Otter Tail County's zoning office as a paradigm of administrative
excellence. Its zoning administrator-a retired businessmanis reputed to be extraordinarily efficient, strict, and respected by
local politicians. 234 Wright County's undistinguished managerial reputation is more typical of rural counties. 235 In both
counties, however, there is enough conflicting evidence about
popular and official attitudes toward zoning to make generaliza236
tions untrustworthy.
232. A comprehensive county-wide zoning ordinance has been in effect in Wright County since September 1967. The required shorelands
regulations were incorporated by amendment in January 1973. Before
then, the ordinance imposed a lakeshore minimum building setback of
only 30 feet. WRIGHT COUNTY, MINN., ZONING ORDINANCES § 10 5-2(d)
(1967). The minimum lakeshore lot area was 20,000 square feet for lots
with individual water and sewer systems, and 15,000 square feet for lots
with community systems. Id. § 10 5-5 (a), (b). Thus, the lot area and
building setback rules were less than half as strict as the DNR's rules
for GD lakes.
233. The county zoning administrator says that countywide zoning
is not yet politically feasible. He believes, however, that as the residents
have become accustomed to state-imposed shoreland zoning some of the
previous fears of land use controls have dissipated. Interview with Malcolm Lee, Zoning Administrator, Otter Tail County, in Fergus Falls
(Sept. 9, 1975).
234. Of course, these conclusions, expressed to the author on numerous occasions, do not necessarily indicate anything about the specific
problem of variances.
235. It would serve no purpose for us to describe the sketchy, and
probably unreliable, facts and rumors that led us to select Wright as the
county that, of all those within commuting range of the Twin Cities, had

the worst reputation for laxity and inefficiency. Suffice it to say that
this conclusion was based upon conversations with state officials and
examination of the DNR's incomplete files of county variances. More
recently, the situation in Wright County may have improved.
236. Even in Otter Tail County there has been plenty of opposition
to zoning. During 1967-69 (prior to the Shoreland Management Act),
public hearings were held on a proposed county zoning ordinance. The

hearings were well attended and strong opposition was expressed. During one "packed" session an opponent pounded his shoe on the table
while attacking zoning as "communism" and "socialism." Responding
to widespread opposition by farmers, the Board of Commissioners unanimously rejected the proposed ordinance. Thereafter, three commissioners who had earlier supported it were voted out of office despite their
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VARIANCES

METHODOLOGY

We studied the impact of variances on two types of shoreland zoning rules: building setbacks and septic tank drainfield
setbacks. In ordinary zoning, setbacks are rather trivial rules,
especially compared to use restrictions. But Minnesota's shoreland zoning standards, as interpreted by the Department of
Natural Resources, do not contain meaningful use restrictions,23 7 and the DNR clearly regards the drainfield setbacks as
outstandingly important. By all anecdotal accounts, the building setbacks are varied much more frequently than any other
state-imposed rule; 238 thus, they were another natural choice for
intensive study. Since building setbacks serve only aesthetic
purposes, while drainfield setbacks are designed to reduce pollution, a joint study of the two rules will enable us to compare
the impact of variances upon different regulatory aspirations.
Inasmuch as both of these rules vary in strictness, depending on
the lake's classification, our study also furnishes some evidence
about the relationship between a rule's strictness and the extent
to which it is subverted by variances.
Of course, we could not measure the ultimate social consequences of variances. Our ambitions were more modest: to
calculate how close to the lake landowners are placing their
houses and drainfields, to determine the extent to which these
distances are affected by variances, and to appraise the results in
the light of the justifications for the setback rules.
We compiled statistics as follows:
1. We examined every building permit issued in Otter Tail
County during one year. 239 In Wright, where there was less
current shoreland construction, we covered two years.
votes on the final resolution. Interview with Kenneth Hanson, Auditor,
Otter Tail County, in Fergus Falls (Aug. 9, 1975). A subsequent effort
to impose a moratorium on development along one of the county's. rivers.
pending adoption of the state's shoreland zoning rules, was defeated
after "extreme reactions by property owners." The spokesman for this
proposal was threatened with lynching at one meeting and was also
warned that a farmer had threatened to shoot him if his canoe was spotted in the river. Interview with Richard Pemberton, attorney, in Fergus
Falls (Sept. 9, 1975). Today, the reaction to zoning is more mixed.
Pemberton, who is active in environmental causes, has observed a continual softening of attitudes from the original violent opposition. He
says that the county and township leaders have come to see the ordinance as a weapon against outsiders, although a substantial undercurrent of opposition remains. Id.
237. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
238. Hambrock Interview (Sept. 19, 1974), see note 83 supra.
239. We compiled our information during the summer of 1975. To
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2. For simplicity's sake, only permits for new dwellings on
lots immediately abutting lakes were considered. 240 These peravoid even the remote possibility that our presence would influence the
decisions being studied, we did not examine 1975 permits. Instead, our
study covered 1974 permits in Otter Tail County and 1973-74 permits in
Wright.
240. Thus, we excluded permits for nonresidential structures (sheds,
for example), additions to preexisting dwellings (new porches, for example), and dwellings on nonriparian lots.
Unless the landowner's lot extends to the water, the absence of a
setback variance (or the small size of the variance) is not necessarily
indicative of how close to the lake the first tier of houses is or will be
erected. To avoid complex assumptions and calculations, we also excluded nonriparian lots even if part of the lot was within the setback
zone and separated from the lake only by a highway, a public beach,
or a small substandard lot.
Of course, we also excluded permits for construction on lots within
municipalities or adjacent to lakes with a surface acreage of less than
25 acres because the statewide rules did not apply to these lots.
It is difficult enough to imagine the aesthetic effects of houses located various distances from the water, without mingling them with
sheds, signs, barns, and enlargements of preexisting houses. Because
sewage plants, power plants, marinas, and the like were less than
one percent of shoreland construction, their exclusion did not affect the
statistics. We excluded buildings in resorts and campgrounds because
we could not readily ascertain whether they were (and would remain)
in the first tier of development around the lake.
Some building permits were for houses to be erected on preexisting
basements or footings, or on basements to be created under existing
houses. In all such cases, we treated the earlier of the two permits as
crucial and included it if it was issued within the study period.
We included mobile homes and travel trailers, except in rare cases
where the building permit contained information indicating that it would
be moved within a few years. We excluded houses on lots that were
so large as to create a substantial risk that the landowner-though perhaps. not presently seeking a variance-would someday subdivide the
lakeside portion of the lot, after which setback variances might conceivably be obtained by residents of the subdivision.
Some new houses--especially farmhouses-are on lots that abut a
lake and are located within 1,000 feet of the lake (so as to be subject
to the shoreland zoning rules), but are so far away from the water that
they may well (already or eventually) be in the second or even third
tier of development. For example, a farmer with an 80-acre tract
abutting a small, marshy lake may choose to build his house on a road
600 feet from the water. Although he is "complying" with the lakeshore
setback, his compliance is not necessarily indicative of how close the first
tier of houses will be to the lake. Such cases could not be detected unerringly because-if no variance was obtained-the building permit
often stated the minimum (not the actual) setback. Besides, it was infeasible to determine in each case whether there was already another
house (on the same lot) closer to the lake. We believe, however, that
we eliminated most of these cases by applying two crude rules-ofthumb: (1) all lots comprising 11 or more acres were excluded from
the Basic Data Pool (BDP) (we calculated that this was the acreage
at which the percentage of building setback variances began to decline
sharply); (2) cases where the permit listed an actual setback, which
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mits were our "Basic Data Pool" (BDP) for the purpose of
analyzing building setback variances.
3. The BDP for the study of septic tank drainfields was derived from the building BDP, but was smaller because, for this
purpose, we excluded any building permit for which a corre241
sponding drainfield permit had never been issued.
4. Concerning every BDP permit, we recorded several kinds of
information: the adjacent lake's classification; whether the
landowner received a building or drainfield setback variance (in
any year); the size of the variance; any recorded reasons for it;
the inspector's notation of the actual setback; whether the lot
was substandard; and, if so, whether it was of record prior to the
effective date of the county's shorelands ordinance.
We defined "variance" broadly, including every recorded
dispensation from the setback rules regardless of whether it
might more properly be called an "exception" instead of a variance.

24 2

was large enough to enable the landowner to subdivide, creating a
standard-sized lot between his house and the lake were also excluded.
For this purpose, the lot area had to be at least twice as large as the
relevant statewide minimum area, and the setback indicated on the
building permit had to be 195, 220, 320, or 320 feet, respectively, for
GD, RD, NE, and C lakes (statewide minimum building setback for
potential second house, plus 20-foot presumed minimum depth of that
house, plus 100 feet between the houses, to allow for one front and one
rear yard).
These exclusions are debatable, but, given the general tenor of our
conclusions, we preferred a method that might overstate the effects of
variances to one that might understate them. In any event, these exclusions did not substantially affect the statistical results of our study.
241. Some landowners build their houses over a period of time and
do not obtain a sewage permit until the house is finished. Lee Interview,
supra note 233. Others never install septic tanks. In Otter Tail County,
privies are common, but, since the county doesn't require a permit for
a privy, the zoning records do not reveal their setbacks. See OTrEa TAIL
COUNTY, MINN., SHORELAND MANAGEMENT ORDINANCES § VI(A) (1) (1973)
(no permit is necessary for structures of less than 100 square feet).
Finally, some landowners install holding tanks instead of septic tank
systems. Since the statewide standards do not contain setbacks for holding tanks, we excluded them from our investigation.
242. The distinction between "exceptions," whose prerequisites are
defined more or less concretely by the ordinance, and "variances," issued
in accordance with more nebulous standards of hardship, causes some
confusion even under the best of circumstances. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d
1244, 1246 (1964). Since nearly all of the building setback dispensations
that we examined involved one of the DNR's three categories of permissible dispensations (although not always with adequate proof that the
petitioner was entitled to the dispensation), and thpre was no clear line
between the kinds of dispensations issued routinely by the zoning administrators and those that were issued by the boards, we decided that
for our purposes the distinction would have obscured more than it revealed.
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It would have been useful to distinguish between the impacts of legal and illegal variances; but that was usually impossible. Many variances were issued informally by the zoning
administrators. 243 For example, in Otter Tail County the zoning administrator grants variances whenever he believes that
they are justifiable. 244 In such cases, the building permit contains (at most) a suggestive comment, such as "25-foot setback
variance due to lay of the land." For formal variances, the
records of the boards of adjustment 245 were often equally unenlightening. Furthermore, the justifications for setback variances frequently cannot be verified without inspecting the
premises, which was infeasible, or relying on staff reports, which
did not exist. Apart from these practical difficulties, the relevant
law contains so many ambiguities that, with all the facts known,
many evaluations of individual decisions would still be inconIn most cases, the building permit indicated either that the statewide
setback would be complied with or that a variance of a certain size had
been granted. To be doubly certain, we also examined the minutes of
the boards of adjustment. If the building permit was issued during our
study period, but the variance was issued earlier, we included the case
in our BDP; if the variance was issued during the study period, but the
building permit was not, we treated the variance itself as a building permit, which evidently was what the landowner had done.
If the setback figure on the building permit differed from the one
on the inspector's sheet, we used the latter. (The differences, which appeared rarely in Otter Tail County and never in Wright, were usually
trivial.) Similarly, if the setback figure on the building permit (issued
after a formal variance was obtained) differed from the figure allowed
by the variance, we assumed that the building permit was more likely
to be accurate.
There were also a few cases in Otter Tail where the variance was
expressed in terms of a range (for example, 40-50 feet). We averaged
the figures.
243. For example, we determined that in Otter Tail County during
1974, 314 variances of all sorts were granted. Of these, 254 were issued
informally by the zoning administrator's office. During the first few
years after enactment of the county shorelands ordinance (1971-73),
almost all applicants were required to resort to the Planning Advisory
Commission (PAC), which serves as the board of adjustment in this
county. "Long agendas" led to an informal agreement between the
zoning administrator and the PAC, under which the former was authorized to issue variances "when justified" to "cut red tape." Lee Interview, supra note 233.
244. Id. Lee estimates that about 90% of those to whom his office
denies a variance subsequently request relief from the PAC. We calculated that during 1974 the PAC granted two-thirds of these applications.
Therefore, the practice of issuing informal variances does not appear to
have increased the number of variances.
245. To avoid confusion, we have used the term "board" throughout
the text to refer to Otter Tail County's PAC, as well as Wright County's
Board of Adjustment. See note 243 supra.
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clusive. 246 For these reasons, we calculated the impact of all
variances, not just the illegal ones.
SEPTic TA.K DRni

B.

uLD SETBACKS

Table I contains the findings pertaining to diainfield setbacks.
TABLE I
SEPTIC TANK DRAINFIELD SETBACKS
NATURAL
RECREATIONAL
GENERAL
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
(75')
(150)
(50')

ACTUAL
SETBACK

W

(Feet)

OT

W

OT

W

OT

CRITICAL
(Dead Lake)
(150'
W

OT

0-25

26-35
36-45
46-49

___

___

___

8?

50 feet

51-55
56-65

3

66-74

3

75 feet

8

1

1

1

6?

1
8?
3

76-85
86-95

96-105

14

106-115

1

116-125

4

2

9

6

1

3

2
4

1

1
1

126-135
136-145

2

3

146-149
1?

150 feet

4

1

1

1

Over 150 feet

6

3

2

3

2?

No Variance,
But Not

NIA

20

NIA

28

NIA

46

40

22

53

5

7

None

None

2

None

3

None

1
1

5

Inspected

BDP
Variances
% Variances

Average
Official
,inimuni
Setback
After

9%

0%

-

None

3
2
67%

-

-

50

50

74

75

120

150

128

115

98129

107121

119140

120

200250

128

-

Variances

Average
Actual
Setback
(Estimated)

246.

See notes 273-80 infra and accompanying text.
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The vertical columns subdivide the data according to lake
classification and county, with the legal minimum setback for
each classification appearing at the top of the table. The horizontal columns show the numbers of BDP drainfields at varying
distances from the lakes. For example, on General Development lakes in Otter Tail, there were four drainfields whose
setbacks were between 116 and 125 feet. All variances are
italicized.
We obtained the "actual setback" figures from the counties'
records. In Wright, every new drainfield is inspected by one of
20 township inspectors; 24 7 in Otter Tail, four employees of
the county zoning office inspect as many systems as time per248
mits.
If the drainfield was inspected, we used the setback figure
recorded on the inspection sheet, which-as the table attestsusually was substantially greater than the legal minimum. In
many cases, however, the recorded figure was ambiguous. For
example, on a General Development lake, the inspector sometimes wrote "50 ft." or "O.K." or "50±," any of which might
mean merely that the permittee had complied with the law.
One Otter Tail inspector says that such notations usually mean
that the actual setback so plainly exceeded the legal minimum
that the inspector didn't bother to measure it. 24 1 On the other
hand, a Wright County official interpreted these styles of annotation to mean that the setback was at or near the legal minimum.250 Perhaps each county has its own consistent methods;
but with a total of 24 inspectors in the two counties, generalizations are probably unreliable, even if each individual inspector
follows a consistent practice. Wishing to be conservative, we
tabulated these cases as if the actual setback were the legal
minimum, using question marks to remind the reader that this
assumption is doubtful. As will be explained, we took account
of this uncertainty when we calculated ranges for the average
actual setbacks.
If there was no inspection, but the permittee received a
variance, we assumed that he placed the system as close to the
247. Interview with Charles Davis, Sanitarian, Wright County, in
Buffalo (Mar. 27, 1976).
248. Interview with Richard Berge, Inspector, Otter Tail County
Zoning Office, in Fergus Falls (Mar. 25, 1976).
249. Id.
250. Davis Interview, supra note 247.
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lake as he had been permitted to do. 251 Those who did not
receive a variance (and were not inspected) are listed separately
in the sixth row from the bottom of the table. Their true
distribution presumably tends to resemble the distribution of the
inspected, conforming drainfields.
To determine the "average official minimum setback after
variances" (second row from bottom) we added the setbacks of
those who received variances to the legal minimum setbacks of
those who did not, dividing the result by the total number of
permittees.
The average actual setback (bottom row) is expressed as a
range to reflect varying assumptions about the meaning of the
ambiguous inspection sheet annotations. To calculate the lower
end of the range, we adopted the conservative assumption described above: that, for instance, "O.K." means exactly the
legal minimum setback. To calculate the upper end of the
range, we discarded this assumption, supposing instead that the
average setback of all conforming drainfields (including those
where the inspector recorded the legal minimum) corresponded
to the average setback of the inspected drainfields whose setback
2 52
exceeded the legal minimum.
The table shows that only seven of the 177 permittees
(about four percent) received a variance. In Otter Tail, there
were no variances except on Dead Lake, the county's only
Critical lake.253 Of the 86 permittees on General Development

251. Obviously, he might place it even closer, but that illegal conduct
is not attributable to the variance. We found only a handful of cases
in which the official inspection revealed that the landowner had built
his drainfield or house closer to the water than he had been permitted
to do, and the discrepancies in those instances were small. Strictly
speaking, these were not variances, but we tabulated them as such because the landowners apparently were not required to build a new drainfield after the inspection, and in this sense they received a kind of informal ex post facto permission to violate the setback rules.
252. Even this figure may be conservative. See text accompanying
note 249 supra.
253. Despite its name, Dead Lakeois unique among the lakes classified
Critical in that the classifiers did not regard it as already badly deteriorated. Under the DNR's formulas, it was on the borderline between
the NE and RD classifications. The planners originally decided to classify
it RD. It was not until the lake was accidentally seen during a field
trip undertaken for other purposes that the classifiers began to consider
classifying it Critical. Their inspection revealed that the existing development was confined to relatively small portions of the shoreline, which
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lakes in both counties, none received a variance. No one on any
lake classification received permission to build a drainfield closer
than 50 feet from the lake; and the closest ones were the eight
complying Otter Tail drainfields, which, though tabulated at
"50 feet," may in fact be much farther back. Thus, the Public
Health Service's recommended minimum setback 2 "4 has not
been affected by variances.
The paucity of variances on GD and RD lakes seems to be
due more to voluntary conduct than to the force of the law. The
table shows that on these lakes most people construct their
drainfields considerably farther back than the law requires. Indeed, there are some remarkable similarities between the average
setbacks for the two classifications. In Wright County, the GD
average is 115 feet; the RD average is 107-121 feet. In Otter
Tail, the conservative GD average is 98 feet. If we had excluded one case where the drainfield was 600 feet from the lake,2 5
the conservative RD average in Otter Tail would have been 99
feet. Excluding the one at 600 feet, and averaging the ranges,
the figures become virtually identical: 105 (OT/RD); 113.5
(OT/GD); 114 (W/RD); and 115 (W/GD).
According to county officials, the location of the drainfield
is largely determined by the professional judgment of the installer, who considers such variables as the size and topography of the
lot.2 56 - At least in the range between 50 (GD) and 75 (RD)
feet, the setback rules may be as unimportant as the variances.
they took to mean that it was not too late to affect the lake's future

by imposing strict land use controls. They also noticed that the lake
was generally quite shallow (a fact undisclosed by the LDS's maximum

depth figure), that large areas of the shoreline were marshy (inex-

plicably, the LDS did not reveal this), and that the shoreland on one
side of the lake was an official wildlife area. They were informed that
the lake was under severe development pressure-"on the edge of being
platted out of existence." Finally, local residents told them that a local
creamery's wastes were being dumped into the lake. With all this in
mind, they concluded that Dead Lake was endangered and classified it
Critical. Thereafter, they received many inquiries from citizens and officials who were puzzled by the classification. Hambrock Interview
(Nov. 10, 1970), see note 83 supra; interview with Richard Lenning,
Shorelands Unit, Dep't of Natural Resources, State of Minnesota, in St.
Paul (Jan. 25, 1971).
254. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
255. Building Permit No. 1909, issued on October 4, 1974, to Ralph
Swanson. The lot has 150 feet of frontage and comprises 2 acres.
The building setback was recorded as "100+.!
256. Berge Interview, supra note 248; Davis Interview, supra note
247.
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On these lakes, the DNR's aspiration has been achieved by
voluntary compliance.
The BDP's for Natural Environment and Critical lakes
are not large enough to provide a basis for even tentative hypotheses about how well the prescribed 150-foot setback will
hold up. 25 7 Although our figures reveal high percentages of
variances on NE lakes in Wright and on the Critical lake in
Otter Tail, none of these variances permitted the drainfield to be
closer than 96 feet from the water, or in other words, almost
twice as far from the lake as the setback rule for General
Development lakes. We have already suggested that the Critical
classification was a mistake,258

a "bad rule" in terms of the

characterizations discussed earlier in this Article.

59

Given the

anomalies of the classification process, and the rather tenuous
evidence supporting specific setback rules, 26 0 we see nothing
alarming in Table I. If septic tanks are seriously polluting lakes
in these counties, there is no reason to blame variances, even
261
assuming arguendo that every variance was illegal.
C.

BUILDING SETBACKS

Table II shows that the building setback rules were much
more drastically undermined by variances than the drainfield
setbacks.
257. Dead Lake is the only Critical lake in either county. The low
rate of construction on NE lakes is probably due to the fact that because
of their size, depth, and previous development density, the popular recreational lakes were generally classified GD or RD. See text accompanying notes 191-202 supra. Natural Environment lakes, by contrast,
tend to be small, shallow, and marshy, and therefore less attractive as
building sites. Id. In Otter Tail County, 534 lakes of less than 150 acres
and 72 larger lakes were classified NE. There are 65 RD lakes and 14
GD lakes in the county. CLAssiFIcATioN ScHEME, supra note 116, at 21.
In Wright County, the figures are: 130 (NE under 150 acres), 42 (other
NE), 35 (RD) and 14 (GD). The statewide totals are: 6982 (NE under
150 acres), 1289 (other NE), 1108 (RD), 279 (GD), and 9 (Critical). Id.
at 22.
258. See notes 206-16 supra and accompanying text.
259. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
260. See notes 156-63 supra and-accompanying text.
261. Many of the permits in the BDP pertained to substandard lots
of record, a point discussed more fully in connection with building setback variances. See text accompanying notes 270-80 infra. Excluding
such lots, the cumulative septic tank drainfield BDP in the two counties
would be 69 (instead of 176) with only one variance (instead of 7). On
NE lakes, excluding substandard lots of record, only one of the eight
permittees received a drainfield setback variance.
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TABLE IT
BUILDING SETBACKS
ACTUAL
SETBACK
(Feet)

GENERAL
RECREATIONAL
NATURAL
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
(7,5)
(100)
(200')
W

OT

W

OT

OT

1

2

W

OT

1

0-25
26-35
36-45

2

5

46-55

2

4

56-65

7

7

1

2

1

9
7

2

6

3

3

75 feet

12?

13?

3

76-85

3

4

2

7

86-95

3

1

1

3

1

7?

7?

66-74

2

2

96-99
100 feet

W

CRITICAL
(Dead Lake)
(200')

1

9
1

1
.7

101-105

2

1

1

1

2

1

106-115

1

116-125

5

4

1

1

1

3

126-135

2

136-145

2

146-155

4

156-165

1

166-175

1

1

1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1

176-185
1

186-195
196-199
200 feet

1

1

Over 200 feet

1

No Variance,
But Not
Inspected

37

24

3

BDP

52

81

26

82

7

10

Variances

14

20

10

46

7

7

8

%Variances

27%

25%

38%

56%

100%

70%

100%

70

70

88

79

117

144

NIA

94

92102

7983

107121

8491

117

144

NIA

94

Average
Official
Minimum
Setback
After
Variances
Average
Actual
Setback
(Estimated)

None

8

Forty-five percent of all the permittees in Otter Tail, and
36% of those in Wright, obtained a dispensation. By lake
class, the percentages of building setback variances range from
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25% (GD lakes in Otter Tail) to 100% (NE lakes in Wright;
the Critical lake in Otter Tail). In Otter Tail County, on every
lake class except GD, most of the landowners received variances.
Twenty-six percent of the BDP on General Development lakes
received variances; 27% of the BDP for all other classifications
received permission to build closer than 75 feet from the lake,
the equivalent of a variance on a GD lake.
True, the "average actual setbacks," listed at the bottom of
the table, exceed the minimums imposed by the rules on both
GD and RD lakes. As the table shows, this is because at least
half of those who did not obtain variances chose to build more
than ten feet farther back than the setback rule required. This
is some evidence (admittedly not conclusive) that the building
setback rules, like the drainfield setbacks, are not having much
effect on the conduct even of those who comply with them-the
site's topography may be more decisive than the law's command.
Even so, the percentages of variances are too high to be
dismissed lightly. The "average setbacks," after all, are somewhat misleading-not as meaningless as "the average temperature in a Minnesota year," but still deceptive. A lakeshore may
be more attractive with two houses 75 feet from the water than
with one at 25 and the other at 125 feet, though the averages are
identical.
We have, therefore, a variance problem that requires further
analysis. To begin with, the DNR evidently anticipated that its
building setbacks would be varied more than any other rule;
these are the only rules for which the Department promulgated
concrete criteria for variances. According to the statewide standards, building setback variances are permissible in three situations:
Where structures incorporate a method of sewage disposal
other than soil absorption; or
Where development exists on both sides of a proposed building site, setbacks may be varied to conform to the existing setbacks; or
In areas of unusual topography or substantial elevation
above the lake level, setbacks may be varied to allow2 a riparian
owner reasonable use and enjoyment of his property. 62
The standards also authorize departures from setbacks
(and other dimensional rules) on substandard lots, platted before the effective dates of the ordinances, if the lot is too small
263
for the landowner to comply with the new rules.
262. MINN. REG.CONS 73 (b) (5) (1970).
263. On these substandard lots of record, "sanitary and dimensional
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In many cases, the counties' records did not sufficiently
reveal the grounds on which variances were granted. From
perusing the records, however, we are reasonably certain that all
or almost all of the variances involved some combination of
grounds generally similar to those authorized by the state, but
not always with sufficient proof that the DNR's prerequisites had
been met. Despite the clear language of the DNR's second
criterion, for example, we found many cases in which a variance
had been granted in order to align the new house with a single
neighbor's house-reason enough to conclude that in these
counties, as in others that have been studied, the boards are too
lenient. Their leniency is certain to have what we called "multiplier effects" ' 26 4 because-even under. the DNR's criterionevery building setback variance tends to justify further "on line
with the neighbors" variances, except where both adjacent lots
are already developed. With the counties ignoring the requirement that the preexisting development be on both sides of the
applicant's lot, there is all the more reason to expect that, as one
dispensation is used to justify another, this type of variance will
2 65
become increasingly common.
At this juncture, it would be easy to reach the conventional
conclusions that the zoning scheme is threatened by leniency
and that therefore reforms should be adopted in order to make
variances more difficult to obtain. Before yielding to this temptation, we should consider whether the variance criteria or the
substantive rules are so deficient that they ought to be redrafted
before the state undertakes a vigorous effort to prevent unjustifiable variances.2 6 6 From this perspective, the first problem is
that many counties did not adopt the DNR's variance criteria
because the DNR did not insist that they do so. In Wisconsin,
as the DNR's planners knew, many counties had not enacted
adequate ordinances until well past the statutory deadline. Minnesota's statute, like Wisconsin's, says that if a county fails to
meet the deadline the DNR "shall adapt the model ordinance to
the county." In both states, the DNR ignored this statutory command because the state officials concluded that such fiats would
win the battle but lose the war. They preferred to explain and
requirements" must be "complied with insofar as practicable." Mlnu.
REG. CONS 73(a) (3) (1970).
264. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
265. So far, of course, nearly all of the preexisting dwellings cited
to justify "on line" variances were constructed before the Shorelands Act.
266. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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cajole, nurturing the delicate, growing sense of state-local
cooperation. Their true power was much weaker than their
apparent statutory power because-while they could force an
ordinance upon a recalcitrant county-the county's attitude
would determine whether (or at least how) the ordinance was
administered. In short, the statutory deadline exerted pressure
on the DNR as well as the counties. The local politicians knew
that they would eventually have to enact shorelands ordinances.
The DNR, on the other hand, must have realized that procrastination by the counties might embarrass the Department, with its
statewide constituency and its overall responsibility for the system, more than the offending counties, whose citizens might be
even more suspicious of zoning than their elected representatives. 2 7 The counties responded by adopting ordinances, if not
28
before the deadline, then within a couple of years thereafter.
The DNR, for its part, gratefully accepted "substantial compliance," overlooking relatively minor departures from the statewide standards. 269 As a result, many county ordinances (includ267. See, e.g., Arrowhead Fights Back, Duluth News-Tribune, Nov.
23, 1975, at 1, col. 2, reporting on a meeting in Ely, Minnesota:
A pickup truck parked outside the Bridgeman store here
Saturday had two bumper stickers on it.
One said, "If the devil doesn't get you, the DNR wilL" The
other was, "Sierra Club: Kiss My Axe."
Those stickers summed up the feelings of the angry northern
Minnesota residents meeting inside.
Worried about increasing land use controls affecting their
lives and property, they voted unanimously to affiliate and fight
the influence of certain government agencies and environmental
groups on these issues.
Coming in for most criticism were the National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, state Environmental Quality Council, Sierra Club and
Izaac Walton League.
Also mentioned but not formally approved were plans to
"close down northern Minnesota" for one weekend next summer
to protest such things as critical areas designation for the North
Shore, a ban on snowmobiles in the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area (BWCA) and a ban on hunting in the new Voyageurs National Park.
"If they want wilderness up here, let them have it," said
one representative. "No gasoline, no lodging, no food for one
weekend."
Also proposed but not adopted was a business boycott of
offending state and federal agencies.
The affiliation of organizations will be called the Northern
Minnesota Environmental Economic Council.
268. See note 217 supra.
269. "There were some things like this [variance criteria] we did not
feel were real crucial and we didn't want to have a battle with each
county about relatively insubstantial departures from the statewide
standards." Gere Interview (Apr. 23, 1976), see note 83 supra. Another
former official says: "It was a crunch situation to get ordinances adopted.
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ing Otter Tail's) were approved despite their omission of the
DNR's building setback variance criteria, creating a situation in
which the old-fashioned case law on variances, the state's criteria,
and the language of each local ordinance are all of uncertain
2 70
relative weight, quite apart from their intrinsic ambiguities.
Even if every county had adopted the DNR's criteria, the
law would not resemble the orderly universe of legal principles
that is described in orthodox variance scholarship. At first
glance, the main problem seems to be imprecise drafting. For
example, the topographical criterion 271 for variances is quite
vague. This provision was designed to be a catchall, covering
situations where, for instance, a variance is necessary to enable
the landowner to see the lake from his cottage, or where the
ground at the setback line is too wet or steep for a building
foundation.27 2 We found such cases; but we also found cases in
which variances were dispensed on other grounds, and one can
only guess whether a court would uphold the dispensation. For
example, variances were granted to enable the landowner to
build in a field, instead of cutting down trees, as would have
been necessary had he built at the setback line. Although these
were not cases of "unusual topography or substantial elevation
above the lake level," preserving trees seems as laudable as
preserving a view of the lake, and the topographical criterion
does not appear to have been written with such meticulous care
that one can safely draw conclusions about the drafter's intentions.
Substandard lots are a much more serious problem. AlI envisioned a second wave, in terms of going back and working with our
regional [DNR] people and trying to improve the ordinances." The
DNR tried to get ordinances that were "80-90% good." Hambrock Interview (May 10, 1976), see note 83 supra.
270. A random sample of 11 approved ordinances, on file at the
DNR, reveals that only one adopted the DNR's criteria verbatim; four
adopted them with some modifications; and six contain only vague boilerplate language with phrases like "practical difficulties" and "unreasonable." Otter Tail copied only the definition of "variance" from the
statewide standards:
a modification or variation of the provisions of the local shoreland ordinance where it is determined that, by reason of exceptional circumstances, the strict enforcement of any provision of
the local ordinance would cause unnecessary hardship, or that
strict conformity with the provisions of the local ordinance
would be unreasonable, impractical or not feasible under the circumstances.
Compare Oi'ER TAm CouNTY, MINN., SHORELAND MANAGEMENT ORDINANCE
§ I(V) (1971) with Mim. REG. CONS 70(d) (1970).
271. See text accompanying note 262 supra.
272. DNR, ELEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS, supra note 123, at 28-29.
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most all of the building permits covered by our study were for
construction on lots platted before the effective dates of the
shorelands ordinances-usually several years prior to passage of
the shorelands act. Many of these lots were not deep enough to
enable the landowner to comply with the new setbacks. This,
more than any other single factor, is the reason for the high percentages of building setback variances. If substandard lots of
record are excluded from the BDP, the overall percentage of
building setback variances falls from 42 to 22%, and the percentage of landowners receiving permission to build within 75
feet of a lake declines even more sharply, from 26 to 5%. Since
there is a finite (albeit unascertained) number of substandard
lots of record, and much unplatted shoreland, the inflation of
variance rates due to this factor should gradually decline. But
in the meantime, substandard lots create questions that the pithy
exemption in the statewide standards does not answer. To what
extent should the road setback, applicable to the rear of the
house, be reduced in order to preserve the lake setback? Should
the building setback be sacrificed in order to place the drainfield
behind the house and thereby preserve as much as possible of
the drainfield setback?
Contrary to the DNR's original expectation, most drainfields are not being constructed between the house and the lake.
For example, on GD lakes in Otter Tail County, Table I shows
an average actual drainfield setback of 98-129 feet, while Table
II shows an average building setback of only 79-83 feet. The
explanation is that the drainfields are commonly placed beside
or even behind the house. Frequently, the house is on a knoll,
and the drainfield is built behind it, with the effluent draining
away from the lake. Reading the rules, which contain larger
setbacks for buildings than for drainfields, one might infer that
this practice is harmful. But the DNR's planners do not claim
that there is any substantive reason why the drainfield ought to
be between the house and the lake. Indeed, on substandard lots
they now recommend placing the drainfield as far as possible
from the lake, if necessary by sacrificing part of the building
setback to allow room for sewage disposal facilities behind the
273
house.
To understand all this, one must recall that throughout the
history of shoreland zoning-in the legislature, then later when
the rules were drafted, and now finally as the rules are being
273.

Miles Interview, supra note 216.
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administered-pollution control has been the paramount objective.274 Beset by a host of difficult drafting problems, the DNR's
planners never managed to establish a coherent aesthetic policy.
The criteria for building setback variances seem to reflect their
awareness of this failure. For one thing, the criteria are generous, covering almost all of the foreseeable circumstances in
which a layman's sense of rough justice might lead him to seek
a variance. More significantly, the Department authorized building setback variances whenever the landowner uses "a method
of sewage disposal other than soil absorption. '275 The model
ordinance says that in these cases the building setbacks "may be
reduced by one-third.

' 27 6

This is a puzzling concession because,

of course, the landowner's method of sewage disposal neither
necessitates nor alleviates the aesthetic impact of a building setback variance. The explanation is that the building setbacks
were parasitic, calculated simply by adding several feet to the
drainfield setbacks. 2 77 Logically enough, the statewide standards
do not contain setbacks for sewage disposal systems ("holding
tanks") from which the effluent is periodically hauled away,
rather than discharged through the soil toward the lake.278 Thus,
the provision for building setback variances in these cases seems
to be attributable to the DNR's general policy of linking building
setbacks to drainfield setbacks. 279

But why draw the line at

274. See text accompanying notes 84-85, 122, 187 supra.
275.
276.

See MNN. REG. CONS 73(b) (5) (aa) (1970).
See MiNN. REG. CONS 77(4.26)(c) (1970).

277. See text accompanying notes 132-34, 168 supra.
278. See MNN.REG. CONS 72(b) (6) (1970).
279. The primary drafter of the rules offers a different explanation.
He says he did not intend to authorize reduction of the building
setbacks in such cases. Instead, he now recalls that he meant to write
the variance criteria conjunctively so that building setback variances
could only be obtained if "a method of sewage disposal other than soil
absorption" is employed, "and" either of the other two enumerated
grounds for a building setback variance exists. The idea was that, since
most people locate the soil absorption system between the house and the
lake, a legitimate building setback variance might generate a parasitic
sewage disposal system variance, a result that could be rendered harmless by requiring the landowner to use a holding tank. Menter Interview
(May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. Although this may well have been
one of the DNR's concerns, we think that his recollection is probably
mistaken because-even if one assumes that the contrary language of the
mandatory statewide standards was due to an oversight-the provision
in the model ordinance for a one-third setback reduction is plainly permissive and can hardly be explained as a prophylactic against parasitic
drainfield variances. Moreover, the DNR's explanatory literature, after
hinting at Menter's explanation, proceeds to explicate the more natural
interpretation of this provision:
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holding tanks? By analogous reasoning, every landowner who
complies with the septic tank drainfield setback would be entitled to a building setback variance; and thus (as Table I demonstrates) hardly anyone would have to comply with the building
setbacks.

280

Plainly, the building setback rules themselves are the crux
of the problem. To justify conclusions about the substantive
effects of variances, or to decide how lenient variance administration should be, one needs a norm against which to measure
the impact of the dispensations. It is convenient and customary-when discussing variances-to accept the rules themselves
as the substantive norms, ignoring the possibility that the rules
as modified by variances are.more sensible than they were before
being modified. With that kind of analysis, all variances (or at
least all illegal ones) are pro tanto substantively harmful. If one
evaluates Table II in this wooden manner, the figures are obviously alarming-most of all on the Critical lake, where everyone in the BDP obtained a variance, and the average official
setback after variances (94 feet) was less than half as great as
the setback rule (200 feet).
But for our purposes, we should not accept the rules as the
norms because we have learned enough about their origins to
realize that they were not derived from profound planning
wisdom. The building setbacks, as we have seen, were calBuilding setbacks are probably the most difficult standards
to prescribe in a zoning ordinance. A wide variety of local conditions can make these standards unreasonable when applied to
individual cases. Therefore, these standards are, and should be,
flexible to allow reasonable development and to treat equally
all property owners in similar situations. Reasonability infers
[sic] that the exceptions and variances do not circumvent other
restrictions, such as sewage disposal standards, and will not
interfere with public use of the ody of water, such as placing
docks so as to obstruct navigation.
Much of the reasoning for building setbacks is based upon
the need for adequate sewage disposal. Where methods of disposal other than soil absorptionare employed, the need for large
setbacks is reduced. This condition, then, constitutes a strong
argument for varying setback requirements.
DNR, ELEMENTS AN ExPLANATioNs, supra note 123, at 319 (emphasis
added).
280. Ironically, the DNR now regards holding tanks as less desirable
than drainfields because of the danger that landowners will dump the
contents in the lake "on some dark night." Interview with David Milles,
supra note 216. We found no cases in which a building setback variance
was sought or granted on the express ground that the landowner planned
to install a holding tank, but many in which the landowner could have
urged this ground (because he did install a holding tank), but instead
obtained his variance on some other ground.
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culated by adding several feet to the drainfield setbacks on
the mistaken assumption that the drainfield would normally be
located between the house and the lake. Although building
setbacks serve no purpose but aesthetics, they were determined
by a method-perhaps reasonable as an expedient, but senseless
as an ideal-that had nothing to do with preserving beauty. From
the standpoint of aesthetics, there is no more reason to be
alarmed by a house with an illegal 100-foot variance, which is
located 100 feet from a Natural Environment lake, than by a house
needing no variance which is the same distance from a Recreational Development lake. To the extent that these classes of
lakes differ, the typical RD lake probably is more naturally
attractive (and more often used by boaters) than the shallow,
marshy NE lakes. 281 This distinction is even more marked in the
case of Critical lakes, which were crudely selected even for the
purpose of pollution control,28 2 and which, though governed by
much stricter building setbacks, are presumably less beautiful
than most RD lakes.
The comparison of lake classifications becomes still more
ironic when one recalls that-for Natural Environment and
Critical lakes-the DNR's planners did not follow their own
basic method for calculating building setbacks: instead of
adding 25 feet to the drainfield setback, as they had done for
GD and RD lakes, they added 50 feet, evidently in order to
discourage construction around these lakes. 283 Even if one
regards this as a legitimate technique, the fact remains that its
purpose was to prevent pollution, not to preserve beauty.
The peculiarities of Minnesota's variable building setback
rules should, of course, be distinguished from the intrinsic difficulties of determining the proper balance between enjoyment of
riparian property rights and preservation of shoreland amenities.
It would be unreasonable to expect rigorous proofs that particular setbacks are ideal. The problem is too complicated and
subjective. For example, the first house that breaks through the
screen of trees around a lake may spoil the atmosphere much
more dramatically than any subsequent intrusion. For this
reason, individual variances may be even more harmful than our
281. To be sure, one might partially justify the DNR's variable building setbacks on the ground that NE lakes are less developed than RD
lakes. But that was the only one of the several classification criteria
that makes sense in aesthetic terms. See generally text accompanying
notes 181-216 supra.
282. See text accompanying notes 203-16 supra.
283. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
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table suggests. Conversely, on a heavily developed lake, variances may be relatively inconsequential. Otter Tail has no
tree-cutting rules; so the view from the lake may often be of
lawns, a fact that could be more significant than the distance
between the water and the house. Other complexities are easy
to imagine.
If the DNR's building setbacks had been based on intuitive
judgments about such matters, they would be at least a useful
point of departure for analyzing the effects of variances. Regrettably, they were not. In terms of the characterizations
suggested earlier in this Article, the building setbacks are bad
rules. 284 Not "bad" in the sense that any one of them, as a
uniform statewide rule, would be indubitably undesirable; but
bad in the sense that the variable building setbacks imposed by
the classification system are essentially adventitious. Until this
fundamental flaw in the rules is corrected, it will be difficult to
justify further state intervention (for example, a veto power) on
substantive grounds.
The state's planners are well aware of these anomalies, and
also that the 200-foot setback on NE and Critical lakes is
exceedingly-perhaps unjustifiably-strict. 285 Evidently recognizing that the Critical classification was misconceived, the DNR
has reclassified some of these lakes. 28 6 But the planners have
not undertaken any general revision of the building setback
rules. Perhaps variances have functioned as a "political safety
valve,' 28 7 placating landowners affected by the 200 foot setback,
so that the Department feels no pressure to reconsider it. 2 88 If
284. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text. The building setbacks imposed under the Minnesota Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, MNm.
STAT. §§ 104.31-.40 (1976), are distinctly more reasonable because the
rivers designated under that act are classified largely by aesthetic criteria, with the strictest setbacks applying to the choicest rivers. See
Mnnq. REG. NR 78(f) (1974) (rivers eligible for inclusion) and MNIN.
REG. NR 79 (c) (3) (bb) (1974) (structural setbacks).
285. The primary drafter says that, in retrospect, he thinks the 200foot setback was excessive. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note
83 supra. The present chief of the Shorelands Unit says that "the big
consideration is sewage, not aesthetics. I've seen cabins right on the
shoreline and they look beautiful. It all depends on the finish." Interview with David Milles, Senior Hydrologist, Dep't of Natural Resources,
State of Minnesota, in Minneapolis (Oct. 31, 1975).
286. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
287. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
288. One official surmises that the rule hasn't been changed because the DNR has felt no political pressure to do so. Menter Interview (May 19, 1976), see note 83 supra. This may be less because of
variances than because so far most development is on the generally more
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so, the local boards might more justly be criticized for delaying
desirable revisions of the law than for subverting comprehensive
planning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our thesis has been that much can be learned by studying
variances in the context of a regulatory system designed to
achieve certain substantive results. In the first part of this
Article, we mentioned three reasons for such an inquiry: (1) to
assist drafters of land use controls; (2) to gather evidence
about whether strict variance criteria are necessary; and (3) to
facilitate informed choices among the various possible reforms
of variance administration.
Like most drafters, Minnesota's planners took account of
legal and political constraints. Our report provides information
about another relevant consideration: the extent to which a
rule's ostensible leniency or strictness will be altered by, on the
one hand, voluntary conduct and, on the other, variances. With
reliable evidence about these matters, the state's planners might
have chosen different rules. They would have known, for example, that (at least in the two counties studied) it does not matter whether the drainfield setback is 50 or 75 feet. Whichever rule
is chosen, there will be few variances, and the average distance
between the drainfield and the lake will be somewhat over 100
feet. In this respect, Minnesota's variable rules, even if otherwise rational, may have been a superfluous complexity.
Concerning the necessity for strict variance criteria, we
found immense differences between the two rules that we
studied, even though-in orthodox legal terminology-they would
be lumped together as "area restrictions." For drainfield variances, the DNR did not publish concrete criteria. Nevertheless,
the moderate setbacks worked exceptionally well because only a
tiny percentage of those affected by the rule requested a variance. For such rules, variance administration need not be strict;
it need only be fair.
The building setback variances are a much more complicated problem. We have seen that administratively-drafted variance criteria can obfuscate the law rather than clarify it, as
popular RD and GD lakes. See Table II, at p. 828 supra. It might there-

fore be more accurate to suppose that, as vacant shoreland on GD and
RD lakes becomes more scarce and development on NE lakes consequently increases, setback variances will become a political safety valve.
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some reformers have hoped. Minnesota's experience reinforces
the common-sense conclusion that agencies whose mission is to
draft a one-shot solution to a substantive problem are likely to
treat administrative issues, including variance criteria, as secondary. Hence, our study might be interpreted as further support
for the concept of a state land use agency, with a clear and
continuing mandate to reform zoning administration, not merely, for example, to curb lake pollution.
But the maj or moral of this tale is not that new agencies
should be established. It is, rather, that scholars should cross
the artificial line between rules and dispensations because, for
substantive and perhaps even for ethical purposes, the two are inseparable. No agency, however impressive its credentials, should
be expected to draft and enforce strict variance criteria for a 200foot lakeshore building setback, whose only justifications are an
irrelevant study of nutrient migration and a false assumption about the relative locations of houses and their adjoining
septic tanks. To be sure, there are reasons for obeying bad
rules until they have been changed. But there are even better
reasons for changing them. More often than scholars have
habitually supposed, the leniency of zoning boards may be
associated with, if not necessarily caused by, the absence of
cogent justifications for the rules being varied, notwithstanding
the clich6s about the presumptive wisdom of planners. In such
circumstances, the first priority should be rule-revision, both for
its own sake and because it may ameliorate the variance problem. For example, our data show that very few landowners
obtain a variance from the 75-foot building setback, except on
substandard lots of record. 28 9 Even a 100-foot setback might
work well, especially if the state's planners-having discarded
the 200-foot setback-were to redraft their variance criteria,
making them clearer and perhaps stricter. Until something of
this sort is done, the actual building setbacks will be the illegitimate children of dubious rules and lawless variances.
Another, more portentous lesson can be learned from the
history of shoreland zoning in Minnesota. Simply put, the lesson
is that centralized planning, whatever its virtues, does not eliminate the sheer difficulty of regulating land use. The DNR's
planners made some mistakes, as anyone would; but they were
nonetheless uncommonly idealistic, knowledgeable, and prudent.
Yet they did not achieve very many of their aspirations. Tree289. See pp. 832-33 supra.
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cutting rules and regulation of farming were (or at least plausibly seemed to be) impolitic; mandatory zoning districts were
infeasible; the large lot sizes were a mixed blessing; cluster
developments did not appear; beautiful lakes and rivers did not
receive special protection; there was not enough time to draft
individual management plans for each watershed; the common
law variance criteria were not substantially clarified; and the
setback rules were, in varying degrees, questionable, unnecessary,
and ineffective. Managing the landscape by zoning is far more
difficult than most scholars-too readily inclined to round out a
thesis by proposing new laws-have acknowledged. After all,
who among us can tell the planners how to make real lakes look
like a picture of "ideal lakeshore development"?

